‍Starting a love affair is easy, getting out tough

‍Afghanistan: “We are coming very close to a decision. Stay the course”

‍“We are awaiting orders. In the meantime, carry on!”

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‍2014: The witching hour was approaching, still no plan

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‍Obama plan still in floating revision

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‍Close of 2011: 90,000 troops left

‍Close of 2012: 68,000 troops left

‍2013: Mission consists of training, advising, and assisting Afghan forces, but US forces were still fighting.

‍Spring 2013: Afghan forces fully responsible for security

‍Summer 2013: US force level 60,000, commence withdrawals to 34,000 troops by February 2014

‍February 2014:  34,000 troops, then shrink the numbers to 1,000 by early 2017

‍December 31, 2014: NATO mission concludes.

‍Post 2014: DoD pushes to leave 8,000 - 12,000 troops, 5,000 of which are for NATO missions. General Mattis sought 13,600 for US missions, and 6,400 from NATO, totaling 20,000. General Dunford sought 10,000 or nothing.

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‍White House spokesman Jay Carney warned that the United States might withdraw completely from Afghanistan if the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) is not signed “promptly.” He said, “I don’t have specific deadlines or other policy decisions to announce today. But I can tell you that we are talking about weeks, not months. And, you know, the clock is ticking.”

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‍President Karzai remained firm in delaying the signature of the BSA until after the April 2014 elections. General Dunford remarked, “All I can tell you is that our Government has been clear that if the BSA is not signed soon, we simply have to make plans for an alternative option if there isn’t a BSA. So that’s really all I can tell you in terms of the timing.” 

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‍General Dunford seemed to be hanging his hat on keeping 10,000 troops after 2014, because fewer than 10,000 would be insufficient to defend those left. He advocated 10,000 after 2014 or none at all.

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‍Deputy National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes said at a Washington news conference on January 29, 2014, 

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‍“Because of the need to coordinate this planning internationally with the Afghan government and within our own military, we still believe this (The BSA) needs to be done in the next several weeks and not delayed until after the election.”

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‍President Karzai said he “saw no good” in the American presence in Afghanistan,

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‍“This whole 12 years was one of constant pleading with America to treat the lives of our civilians as lives of people ... They (the US) did not work for me, they worked against me. The money they (the US) should have paid to the police they paid to private security firms and creating militias who caused lawlessness, corruption and highway robbery ... They then began systematically waging psychological warfare on our people, encouraging our money to go out of our country... What they did was create pockets of wealth and a vast countryside of deprivation and anger ... In general the US-led NATO mission in terms of bringing security has not been successful, particularly in Helmand.”

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‍It is worth recalling that the US came to Afghanistan in 2001 to overthrow the Taliban government and stamp out terrorism. Broadening the mission to spread democracy seems to have backfired.

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‍The US met its goal of drawing down its force levels in Afghanistan to 34,000 by February 2014. The main challenge yet facing US force planners was whether they would have to plan to withdraw completely by year’s end.

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‍On February 4, 2014, President Obama met with top defense leaders, VP Biden, and Secretary of State Kerry at the White House to discuss Afghan options. It did not appear that anything decisive was achieved. Laura Magnuson, a White House spokesperson, said, 

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‍“The president continues to weigh inputs from military officials, as well as the intelligence community, our diplomats, and development experts and has not yet made decisions regarding the post-2014 U.S. presence.”

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‍In a complete turnabout, the US waited until after the April presidential elections in Afghanistan to determine future force levels and withdrawal schedules. The US would make no decisions on either until then, when it expected the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) to be signed.

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‍The State Department’s inspector general issued a report in February 2014 that said, 

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‍“Key decisions cannot be timely made until the U.S. military presence post-2014 is clarified. Without timely key decisions, the embassy will potentially be unable to fully prepare for the transition from a military-led to civilian-led mission in Afghanistan ... Without U.S. military support, embassy operations may need to be significantly curtailed at diplomatic platforms or the embassy will need to expend substantially greater resources in an effort to address an increased security risk.”

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‍General Dempsey, USA, CJCS, arrived in Afghanistan on February 26, 2014, to discuss full withdrawal planning with military leaders there. He told reporters traveling with him, 

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‍“The idea here is we’re at the point where we have to begin planning for other options. We’ve seen it coming, and I’m sure I’ll find our junior leaders are ahead of me on this … The United States does not want to leave Afghanistan, principally because al-Qaida -- the ideological movement that manifests itself in violence and anti-American, anti-Western activities -- is still alive.”

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‍General Dunford changed his tune in March 2014 and said he could wait until September 2014 for a decision on troop levels for 2014. He told the Senate Armed Forces Committee on March 12,

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‍“If we leave at the end of 2014, the Afghan security forces will begin to deteriorate, the security environment will begin to deteriorate, and I think the only thing to debate is the pace of that deterioration.”

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‍Laura Lucas Magnuson, spokesperson of the National Security Council, was quoted in April 2014 saying, 

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‍“The President has not yet made any decision on the number of troops he may keep in Afghanistan if the Afghan government signs the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA).” 

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‍Because of the Russian invasion of Crimea in February and March 2014, logistics planners became concerned that Russia would block US shipments through the NDN.

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‍The Afghan presidential election was held on April 5, 2014. No candidate received more than 50 percent of the vote, so a second-round runoff was scheduled for June 14. Ashraf Ghani led. President Karzai was not permitted to run.

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‍The U.S. special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, James Dobbins said in May 2014,

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‍“I hope we will decide sometime in the next month or two on the exact size of (the remaining) contingent ... We and our allies, I think, will be prepared for a continuing advisory mission, much smaller numbers than we have there today but still significant in terms of its ability to continue to improve the quality of the Afghan security forces.”

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‍As expected, the Taliban launched its pre-announced spring offensive on the date they said they would, May 12, 2014.

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‍On May 27, 2014, President Obama announced that the US planned to keep 9,800 troops in Afghanistan beyond 2014 and that nearly all forces would be out by the end of 2016. There was still no signature on the BSA.

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‍The USAF inactivated its operations at Manas AB, in Kyrgyzstan, and began using the Mihail Kogalniceanu AB in Romania as a replacement.

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‍As might have been expected, the two candidates for the Afghan presidency, Dr. Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, each claimed in July 2014 that they had won the election. A UN audit was to be conducted. There was a threat that this disagreement could lead to civil war.

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‍General John Campbell, USA, was nominated to command ISAF forces in Afghanistan. At the time of his nomination, he was the vice chief of staff, US Army (VCSA). General Dunford was nominated as the next Commandant of the Marine Corps and would be leaving in October 2014. 

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‍NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen said that NATO must have a signed BSA by September 4, 2014, or it will not be able to provide continued military support after 2014. He told Reuters on August 11, 2014, 

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‍"Soon we will have to take tough decisions, because if there is not a legal basis for our continued presence in Afghanistan, we will have to withdraw everything by the end of this year and to do that we will have to start planning ... very soon.”

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‍The UN delayed the release of its presidential election audit until September 2014. President Karzai said he would leave office on September 9.

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‍General John Campbell, USA, the new ISAF commander, published a letter to the troops. He emphasized, 

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‍“We find ourselves in a decisive phase of our campaign. Amid this summer’s fighting season, political and security transitions are unfolding simultaneously. Dramatic changes are also occurring in our task organization, force laydown, and mission orientation.”

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‍Campbell said “Resolute Support” was the new mission, a non-combat mission. ISAF defined its mission this way: 

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‍“The Resolute Support mission will provide the framework for coalition troops to move into a train, advise, and assist role in Afghanistan.”

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‍NATO moved into an “on hold” position regarding its troop strength after 2014, largely because of indecisions regarding the winner of the presidential election and the failure of Afghanistan to sign the BSA.

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‍In late September 2014, the two candidates for president of Afghanistan agreed on a power-sharing deal. The top vote-getter, Ashraf Ghani, became president but would grant significant powers to the loser, Abdullah Abdullah.

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‍The US and Afghanistan signed the long-delayed BSA on September 30, 2014.

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‍As of October 17, 2014, there were 31 coalition bases still in operation, compared with 840 in October 2011. General Campbell said the withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan was on schedule. Troop levels were to decrease from the current level of just under 40,000 to about 12,000 by the end of 2014.

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‍In early November, General Campbell’s plan was for about 9,800 US forces to remain in Afghanistan after the end of 2014 and for all US forces to be out by the end of 2016. He said he is reassessing this plan.

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‍Lieutenant General Joseph Anderson, USA, Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, said in Washington on November 5, 2014, that Afghan Security Force losses are unsustainable. The Afghans had endured over 9,000 KIA since 2013. 

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‍In October 2014, the DoD issued a report, “Progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan.” This report accused Pakistan of using the Taliban as proxies to help Pakistan maintain influence over Afghanistan.

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‍In November, Afghan President Ghani agreed to let US forces conduct night raids, previously forbidden by President Karzai. President Obama authorized US forces to conduct limited combat operations in 2015 against al-Qaeda and insurgents targeting the Afghan government, such as the Taliban. Secretary of Defense Hagel said US troop strength for 2015 would be 10,800 vice the 9,800 planned earlier.

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‍The NATO operational headquarters in Afghanistan, the ISAF Joint Command, terminated its mission on December 8, 2014, under the command of Lt. General Joseph Anderson, USA. On December 28, 2014, at formal ceremonies in Kabul, NATO and the US formally concluded their combat missions in Afghanistan and began transitioning to a “non-combat mission in a combat environment,” called Resolute Support. The US would maintain about half of its remaining forces outside the NATO training and advising mission, outside Resolute Support. These forces were to conduct counter-terrorism missions, which could include targeting Taliban insurgents connected to groups such as al Qaeda.

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‍On December 29, 2014, Secretary of Defense Hagel put that mission separation into words,

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‍“In Operation Freedom's Sentinel, the United States will pursue two missions with the support of the Afghan government and the Afghan people. We will work with our allies and partners as part of NATO's Resolute Support Mission to continue training, advising, and assisting Afghan security forces. And we will continue our counterterrorism mission against the remnants of Al-Qaeda to ensure that Afghanistan is never again used to stage attacks against our homeland.”

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‍It should be noted that the US, throughout its stay in Afghanistan, always separated the two missions. The “nation-building” missions always took second fiddle. The US contributed some forces to that. However, the core US military mission was to hunt down terrorists, specifically al-Qaeda. The bulk of US forces would be devoted to this, primarily in the eastern provinces.

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‍President Obama closed out the year on December 24, 2014, in his Christmas greeting message, 

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‍"Our war in Afghanistan is coming to a responsible end. Of course, the end of our combat mission in Afghanistan doesn't mean the end of challenges to our security. We'll continue to work with Afghans to make sure their country is stable and secure and is never again used to launch attacks against America.

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‍This does not seem to track with what Secretary of Defense Hagel said the US would still be fighting a ocunterterrorism mission.

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‍2015: Two missions, NATO and anti-terror