‍Starting a love affair is easy, getting out tough

‍Afghanistan: “We are coming very close to a decision. Stay the course”

‍“We are awaiting orders. In the meantime, carry on!”

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‍2011: The withdrawal begins with a strategy shift

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‍Close of 2011: 10,000 troops out, leaving about 90,000

‍Summer 2012: Withdraw 23,000 by the summer of 2012, leaving 68,000 

‍2014: Complete transfer of security responsibility to the Afghans

‍December 2014: Terminate NATO ISAF

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‍In late June 2011, Secretary of Defense Gates said the US strategy would shift: from counterinsurgency to counterterrorism, which targeted terrorist leaders and was more of a military combat mission.

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‍John Brennan, Obama’s Assistant for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, had authored this change in strategy. He told an audience at Johns Hopkins University,

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‍"Our best offense won't always be deploying large armies abroad, but delivering targeted, surgical pressure to the groups that threaten us.”

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‍The idea was to “decapitate their leadership.” We’ve heard this for the US-Iran War.

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‍The military honchos did not like the strategy shift.

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‍General Petraeus preferred the counterinsurgency strategy. He Said he had to go to Kabul to develop a plan. In short, there was no plan.

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‍Admiral Mullen indirectly suggested there was no plan for this strategy shift. He said our commanders would have considerable flexibility to set the pace of withdrawal; the withdrawal plan could be adjusted.

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‍General Allen said he would slow the withdrawals, especially if the ground situation deteriorated. Obama’s plan was more aggressive than the military commanders wanted.

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‍Some Afghan military leaders were skeptical about Obama’s withdrawal plan, asserting they were not ready, especially for logistics.

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‍Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta met with Karzai in Kabul in July. Panetta said the idea was to return the country to the Afghans.

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‍Over the next few years, NATO allies developed national withdrawal plans. US military leaders grew frustrated with them, feeling they were not pulling their weight.

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‍Scuttlebutt was that regional Islamic organizations hoped to establish an Islamic Caliphate in Central Asia after NATO's departure. This made the Russians nervous. Russia's ambassador to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, told Le Figaro, 

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‍"We do not want NATO to go and leave us to face the jackals of war after stirring up the anthill. Immediately after the NATO withdrawal, (Russia) will expand towards Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and it will become our problem then.”

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‍The newly minted US ambassador to Kabul, Ryan Crocker, put the brakes on withdrawal, saying, “There will be no rush to the exits." US forces would remain beyond 2014. 

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‍General Allen was scheduled to present his withdrawal plan in mid-October, with the first 10,000 out by year’s end.

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‍Enemy forces played hardball. In August 2011, they shot down an Army CH-47, killing 38 troops. Five US troops were killed by Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) that month, and several NATO troops were also lost.

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‍The US and Afghanistan were negotiating a security agreement to define who does what. The Afghans dragged their heels.

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‍Admiral Mullen said in September 2011 that the pace of withdrawal was ahead of schedule, but the US and Afghans lacked a common strategy. He said, 

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‍“We must agree upon a strategic partnership declaration with Afghanistan that will clarify and codify our long-term relations.”

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‍As of mid-November 2011, General Allen had not yet provided a detailed withdrawal plan. 

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‍General James Amos, USMC, Commandant USMC (CMC), said in November that the US would transition from counterinsurgency to training and advising, leaving out the counterterrorism mission advocated earlier.

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‍In December 2011, General Allen launched a major offensive in eastern Afghanistan to reduce the influence of Pakistan-based enemy forces. He hoped to maintain a troop level of 68,000 until at least 2014. There was a strong push in Washington to withdraw early, but General Allen opposed it.

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‍Ambassador Crocker suggested US forces could remain beyond 2014, but the Afghans would have to ask.

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‍The withdrawal of 10,000 was completed; 91,000 US troops remained. The strategy now was to advise and support, but General Allen opined, 

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‍“We’re not going to be done by the end of 2014 … The message that we will be here in some form … is a very important message for the Taliban.”

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‍2012: Pack ‘em up, move ‘em out, but how?