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Starting a love affair is easy, getting out tough
Afghanistan: “We are coming very close to a decision. Stay the course”
“We are awaiting orders. In the meantime, carry on!”
Obama Plan
Close of 2011: 10,000 troops out, leaving about 90,000
Summer 2012: Withdraw 23,000 by the summer of 2012, leaving 68,000
2014: Complete transfer of security responsibility to the Afghans
December 2014: Terminate NATO ISAF
2012: A logistics nightmare
Pakistan threw a major wrench into withdrawal planning. In December 2011, Pakistan closed the port of Karachi to US military shipments to and from Afghanistan. Karachi had been a main port of entry and exit. Without the port of Karachi, moving equipment in and out became a logistical nightmare.
Pakistani-US relations had deteriorated for several important reasons:
Estimates in August 2012 were that the US would have to move 200,000 twenty-foot shipping containers and equipment worth $60 billion.
In September 2012, the US operated three “retrosort yards” at Kandahar in southeast Afghanistan, Bagram Air Base (AB) in the northeast outside Kabul, and Camp Barmal in east-central Afghanistan.
A retro sort yard is a specialized facility, often located in combat zones such as Afghanistan, that processes, sorts, and redistributes or disposes of military equipment during retrograde operations. A retrograde operation is an organized withdrawal from the enemy.
Such a massive number of containers could not be moved by air alone; costly and slow, and it was arguable whether the US had sufficient air cargo capacity.
Military planners had to arrange an alternate route. An exit route through Pakistan was too insecure. The other option was to use the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) through Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Russia, and then ship through the Black Sea or the Baltic Sea.
The US had been using theNDN to bring supplies in, by one account 52% of coalition supplies of which 40% was meant for the US.
NATO was also using an air base in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, and the Manas air base in Kyrgyzstan, so some equipment and troops could be sent that way, but this was only a trickle compared to what had to be moved.
There were all kinds of questions about the NDN:
The US began closely examining the NDN to get equipment out; agreements covered only non-lethal items. Guns would have to be removed from Bradley and Humvee vehicles, and shipping armored tanks was out of the question.
By the end of February 2012, General William Fraser, USAF, commander of the US Transportation Command, said the US had obtained approval from NDN host countries to move military cargo into and out of Afghanistan.
In July 2012, the US and Pakistan signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to reopen land routes through Karachi for NATO supplies to Afghanistan, ending a seven-month blockade. The deal permitted transport without additional fees, restricted weapons shipments, and allowed Pakistan to monitor containers via radio trackers.
The MoU was not necessarily binding. The US saw Pakistan as a problem.
Where are we in this Afghan War?
Questions began to dominate as to whether the US could actually transition security responsibility to the Afghans by 2014.
Stars & Stripes said a 2011/2012 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) reported the Afghan war was mired in stalemate, the Afghan government was corrupt, the Afghans could not weather an American withdrawal, and questioned a withdrawal by 2014.
A classified NATO report was leaked, stating that the Taliban would take over after the withdrawal. There were indications that the US could live with that.
Withdrawal schedules remained firm. However, Secretary of Defense Panetta wanted a more rapid departure. Keep in mind that US and NATO forces were still fighting.
The grapevine contended the US never had an Afghan strategy. General Petraeus, now Director of the CIA, said a major transition would have to occur in 2013 to be out by 2014. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton remarked,
“We are just at the beginning of this process of exploration whether or not there is an opportunity to bring about an end to the conflict through a political solution … There will continue to be all kinds of speculation about what is or is not happening.”
Reading the headlines in February 2012 would cause one’s head to spin:
Word leaked out that US diplomatic and military leaders were secretly talking to the Taliban, perhaps for as long as a year or more, without President Karzai. Talks with the Taliban were filled with conditions and provisos.
As of mid-March 2012, the US and Afghanistan still had not agreed on a long-term security arrangement, the BIlateral Security Agreement (BSA). US senior leadership was now concerned about how to get out.
In a surprise announcement in mid-March 2012, Afghan President Karzai demanded that the US withdraw its forces from villages and rural areas and confine them to bases. He said,
"Afghanistan is right now ready to completely take all security responsibilities, so we demand a speedy transition and the handover of responsibility to the Afghans."
He hoped to achieve an “accelerated and full transition of security responsibilities.”
General Allen said in late March 2012 that he was on schedule to withdraw 23,000 more troops by September, but had not yet made his recommendations on what the levels should be thereafter.
Allen said he felt he needed “significant combat power in 2013” for eastern Afghanistan, the main area for terrorist operations.
General Allen was in a bit of a pickle. On the one hand, he was obliged to meet the withdrawal deadline. On the other hand, he had to reposition and reorganize the remaining forces to deal with the Taliban. Finally, protection was required for those troops packing up.
US combat forces found themselves in some kind of battle nearly every day. They had to patrol a very large area each day to hunt down terrorists, find their caches, clear the roads of land mines, and try to befriend the locals. And they had to help pack up.
A new U.S.-Afghan Strategic Partnership Agreement was signed in May 2012. Afghanistan agreed to “provide U.S. forces continued access to and use of Afghan facilities through 2014, and beyond as may be agreed...for the purposes of combating al-Qaeda and its affiliates.” NATO agreed to remain beyond 2014.
This Partnership Agreement was a broad, long-term framework for non-military cooperation, including economic development and democratic institution-building. What remained outstanding was the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA), a legally binding pact detailing the legal status of US forces, bases, access, and counterterrorism operations after 2014. The US military wanted the BSA far more than the Partnership Agreement.
President Obama said he believed the US had broken the Taliban’s momentum. At a NATO summit in May 2012, he said, “The Afghan War, as we understand it, is over” once the 2014 withdrawals are complete.
General Douglas Lute, USA (Ret.), Obama’s deputy security advisor, added, “Combat will end at the stroke of midnight (on Dec. 31, 2014).”
However, a Department of Defense (DoD) report in May 2012 said, “The insurgency remains a resilient and determined enemy and will likely attempt to regain lost ground and influence this spring and summer.”
On September 21, 2012, Secretary of Defense Panetta announced that all 23,000 US troops scheduled for withdrawal had withdrawn. He said that US forces had reversed the Taliban’s momentum.
On September 18, 2012, a report stated that US commanders believed 25 percent of the Afghan Army and Police had been infiltrated by the enemy. Former Ambassador to Kabul Ryan Crocker responded, saying, “It’s worse than that. I would put the percentage rather higher … I think we underestimate at our peril (the number of Taliban) sleepers (in the ranks).”
In October 2012, President Obama decided to replace General Allen with General Joseph Dunford, USMC, saying Dunford was needed to provide a “fresh look.”
In October 2012, the Taliban launched a major nighttime attack on Camp Bastion and Camp Leatherneck in southern Helmand Province, the former a British base and the latter a Marine base. One team destroyed six Marine AV-8 Harrier fighters and three refueling stations, and damaged two additional AV-8s. The fighting was fierce. Two Marines were killed, and 14 attackers were killed, with one captured.
Building up the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) was not going well, together known as the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). There had been numerous “Afghan insider” attacks on NATO forces. This bred deep mistrust between the ANA-ANP and NATO troops. The ANA-ANP desertion rate was so high.
The US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) issued a report released on November 1, 2012 that said,
“The Afghan government will likely be incapable of fully sustaining ANSF (Afghan National Security Forces) facilities after the transition in 2014 and the expected decrease in U.S. and coalition support.”
Additionally, it said the government was beset with corruption and mismanagement, and there were increasing insider attacks.
NATO Secretary General Anders Rasmussen said NATO forces were in Afghanistan in response to a UN NATO mandate, but after 2014, NATO would require an Afghan invitation. The core of its efforts would be training.
US planning for the post-2014 world in Afghanistan focused on how many US troops would be needed. All planning would have to be negotiated with the Karzai government. A sticking point was that US forces were immune from Afghan prosecution. By the end of November, the US still had not decided on a single number of troops to remain after 2014. Obama’s goal was to be completely out by then.
The Senate confirmed General Dunford to be commander of NATO and US forces in Afghanistan. He told senators he had not been involved in planning for Afghan forces. He acknowledged having little experience in Afghanistan. He said there would be two main missions: counterterrorism and advising. Secretary of Defense Panetta noted that fighting al-Qaeda would be a “core US mission for years to come.” In short, the counterterrorism mission was back in vogue.
President Karzai again made his outlook known in December 2012, saying,
“The U.S. and NATO forces are going to withdraw from Afghanistan by the end of 2014, but before that — in 2013 — the transition of security is going to be completed, and there will be no military activity of foreign forces in Afghanistan. We are working to make this transition of security happen sooner. We want all the foreign forces to come out of the villages and go to their bases so the Afghan forces can carry out the security.”
By the end of 2012, estimates indicated that Afghans were responsible for about 75 percent of the country. As of October 25, 2012, fifty-two foreign troops had been killed by Afghans, and about half of them were Americans.
Most US forces were forecast to be at Bagram AB near Kabul. By November, ISAF had turned over 240 of 400 bases to the ANSF.
By year’s end, it was an open question where the Afghan War stood. If you were assessing the transition as a withdrawal from Afghanistan, the US was on course. If you assess what is being left behind in terms of a stable government and national security, the transition was not doing well.
Pentagon press secretary George Little said on November 26, 2012,
“We really haven’t reached a point at which any single number (for the US troop strength beyond 2014) has ripened into a recommendation … Within the next several weeks, we’ll see this process play out.”
Secretary of Defense Panetta had noted earlier in November,
“General Allen has worked on several options (about troop levels beyond 2014 in Afghanistan) that we are now reviewing and working with the White House on. And my hope is that we'll be able to complete this process within the next few weeks. I’m confident that we're going to be able to get to the right number that we're going to need for the post-2014 presence.”
It was clear that US forces would remain in Afghanistan after the 2014 withdrawal deadline. The plan was for them to focus on training and advising, implying that both counterinsurgency and counterterrorism missions were being scrubbed. Vice President Joseph Biden said, “We are leaving in 2014. Period.” But President Obama said there would still be an enduring international military presence beyond 2014.
2013: What’s the plan? An indecisive year
Table of Contents
Brief background
Obama announces withdrawal
2011: Obama Plan & Strategy Shift
Where are we in this war?
2015: Two missions: NATO & Anti-terror
2016: Taliban gaining, now ISIS
2017: Not winning, Need new strategy
2018: No one said it would get better
Conluding remarks
Ed Marek, editor
Marek Enterprise
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