‍Starting a love affair is easy, getting out tough

‍Afghanistan: “We are coming very close to a decision. Stay the course”

‍“We are awaiting orders. In the meantime, carry on!”

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‍2013: What’s the plan? An indecisive year

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‍Obama plan now in floating revision

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‍Close of 2011: 90,000 troops left

‍Close of 2012: 68,000 troops left

‍2013: Mission consists of training, advising, and assisting Afghan forces.

‍Spring 2013: Afghan forces fully responsible for security

‍Summer 2013: US force level 60,000, commence withdrawals to 34,000 troops by February 2014

‍February 2014:  34,000 troops, then shrink the numbers to 1,000 by early 2017

‍December 31, 2014: NATO mission concludes.

‍Post 2014: DoD pushes to leave 8,000 - 12,000 troops, 5,000 of which are for NATO mission troops. General Mattis sought 13,600 for US missions, and 6,400 from NATO, totaling 20,000.

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‍The year 2013 was marked by indecision about the planned 2014 withdrawal and the end-state force structure. There was bickering between the US and Afghanistan at the presidential level over the character of the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA). A BSA was needed to adequately plan force levels. Everyone tried to determine what US force levels would be at the end of 2014, if any. Logistics was still a central issue. In setting forth troop level numbers, the point that was not obvious was iwhy those troops were needed, what would they be doing?

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‍President Obama started the year 2013 with a bang. Following meetings with President Karzai, he said,

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‍“Starting this spring (2013), our troops will have a different mission—training, advising, assisting Afghan forces … This sets the stage for the further reduction of coalition forces.”

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‍Of note is that Obama did not address counterterrorism or counterinsurgency as a mission.

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‍President Karzai said,

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‍“In spring this year (2013), the Afghan forces will be fully responsible for providing security and protection to the Afghan people.”

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‍That would be fully a year in advance of what the US had said.

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‍Afghanistan’s Defense Minister was worried the US would abandon Afghanistan. The Afghan ambassador to the US said Afghanistan needed US support. Members of the Afghan parliament expressed concerns that the Taliban would take over. The Finance Minister said that such a rapid US withdrawal would undermine the Afghan economy. Individual Afghans who had been supporting US forces were becoming anxious.

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‍NATO planners expected their forces to remain beyond 2014 and focused on which capabilities would need to be retained.

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‍As of February 1, 2013, a report indicated that ISAF had handed over 376 checkpoints, camps, bases, and other facilities to the Afghan government while closing 243 other sites. The disposition of 193 other bases — including most of the largest ones — would be determined in negotiations that could stretch into 2014.

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‍General Allen turned over command of ISAF to General Dunford on February 10, 2013.

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‍The US began using routes in Pakistan to ship equipment out, moving 50 shipping containers out of Pakistan in mid-February 2013. Recall estimates that the US would have 200,000 such containers to move. The US also began testing the movement of equipment into Uzbekistan, hoping some would move by air and rail.

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‍In his State of the Union address to Congress in February 2013, President Obama announced that the US would withdraw an additional 34,000 troops by February 2014, one year hence. President Karzai welcomed the announcement. For its part, the DoD pushed to leave 8,000 troops after the 2014 deadline and then reduce the number to 1,000 by early 2017.

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‍An ISAF news release of February 13, 2013, said, 

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‍“The ANSF is currently providing security for the majority of the Afghan population and leading the vast majority of operations across Afghanistan. The ANSF, with support from the International Security Assistance Force, has successfully pushed the majority of violence out of the country's population centers.”

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‍General Dennis Via, USA, commander of Army Material Command (AMC), said budget shortfalls were slowing the withdrawal. He was flying out a lot of equipment, which was expensive, and noted that US forces were packing up and fighting at the same time, a kind of “fighting withdrawal.”

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‍A Pentagon spokesman said in late February 2013 that the size of the overall NATO mission would likely be between 8,000 and 12,000 after 2014, with many of them American. NATO ministers met in Brussels, and the discussions were said to be tense. The US was said to be pushing for 5,000 American troops for the NATO training mission and 5,000 committed to fighting terrorism. The plan was for 15,000 NATO troops for training, of which many would be American. The  US commitment to only 5,000 of the 15,000 left the Europeans in a huff.

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‍Secretary of Defense Panetta, following the NATO meetings, said the US would leave 60,000 through the spring and summer of 2013, then cut to 34,000 by February 2014, and then the US would execute its final withdrawal.

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‍NATO Secretary General Rasmussen said NATO force projections for the post-2014 period would be available in midyear. NATO still counted on the US to provide the bulk of forces.

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‍In March 2013, General James Mattis, USMC commander, CENTCOM, recommended the US maintain 13,600 troops in Afghanistan after 2014, with other NATO countries contributing another 6,400 troops, bringing the total to 20,000.

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‍In the meantime, General Lloyd Austin, USA, was confirmed by the Senate to replace General Mattis at CENTCOM. He advocated a robust US presence after 2014. He wanted to hedge his bets against any Taliban mischief. He expected the Taliban to be determined and agile, prepared to test the Afghan security forces.

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‍General Dunford placed US forces on alert in Afghanistan in response to President Karzai’s inflammatory anti-American remarks. Dunford was worried that Karzai might try to turn his American-trained forces against US forces.

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‍Major General Kurt Stein, USA, was in charge of withdrawing American equipment from Afghanistan. He knew his people had to move 35,000 vehicles, 95,000 shipping containers, and a lot of other equipment out. Indecision about the post-2014 force structure in Afghanistan was problematic. He figured it would cost $6 billion to move this equipment and he would need 86,000 people to do it. Complicating this was the need to keep enough supplies for the remaining troops. He was quoted,

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‍“(The Afghan withdrawal) will be historic, it’s nothing like we have ever done in the history of our military. There is no other organization in the world besides the U.S. military that can do this. There is no doubt about that.”

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‍Stein expected the lines to Karachi port to be long and vulnerable. Concerns increased about how many Taliban might be lingering in and around Karachi. Use of the NDN will require intense coordination. Equipment that flew out would go home, or to Jordan, Dubai, and Oman, and then be transferred to ships.

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‍Brigadier General Steve Shapiro, USA, deputy commander of the unit overseeing the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, said Bagram Air Base had three 60,000 ft. warehouses. He had 28,000 vehicles and 20,000 shipping containers that must be moved by the end of 2014. He said they cannot let things pile up, or they will never move them. The outflow has to be steady, 24-7.

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‍By the end of March 2013, the first shipment from Karachi Port had gone out without a hitch. The initial shipment included more than 70 containers and 20 military vehicles. The plan was to ship a combined total of 100 containers and vehicles each month thereafter.

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‍General Dunford made some pointed comments in early April 2013,

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‍“The war in Afghanistan is entering an uncertain and dangerous phase. Transitions, by definition, are very, very difficult times. They're filled with friction. They're filled with challenges. And that's what we're seeing. We're seeing the emergence of democracy over time. In these next couple of months, I expect those decisions (on force levels) to be made, and I think -- I believe we'll know by the summer, generally speaking, what the future is. And the president of the United States and the president of Afghanistan are certainly committed to try to get this bilateral security agreement done by the May-June time frame. We came here because there was a threat of international terrorism from this region … And we haven't yet set the conditions where that won't occur again.”

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‍Lieutenant General James Terry, USA, the departing US second-in-command in Afghanistan, told reporters on April 30, 2013, 

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‍“I’m not going to make any predictions. My first time here in 2007 there were a lot of well-intended people making claims about the last gasp of the insurgency. Frankly, (the insurgency) is very resilient.”

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‍Admiral James Stavridis, USN, the outgoing commander of US European Command (EUCOM) and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), said on May 9, 2013, 

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‍“When I look at Afghanistan, we still have five years to go before we can really disengage.”

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‍Effective June 18, 2013, the Government of Afghanistan and its Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) had taken full security responsibility for all of Afghanistan. General Dunford said, 

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‍“We are entering the final phase of the security transition. Two weeks ago, the NATO defense ministers approved the concept for a new mission in Afghanistan beginning in 2015. The details of this new mission, called Resolute Support, will be developed in the coming months.”

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‍At about the same time, senior US officials said the US would enter direct, bilateral peace talks with the Taliban at the latter’s offices in Doha, Qatar, within a matter of days. The Karzai government would be brought in later. The Taliban had previously refused to meet with the Karzai team. The Taliban opened its office in Doha on June 18, 2013. The Taliban said it would continue fighting while negotiating. 

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‍On June 18, President Karzai suspended BSA negotiations with the US to protest the US's holding bilateral talks with the Taliban without Afghan representation. He said, 

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‍“In view of the contradiction between acts and the statements made by the United States of America in regard to the peace process, the Afghan government suspended the negotiations, currently underway in Kabul between Afghan and U.S. delegations on the bilateral security agreement.”

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‍Logistics authorities said they would move significant amounts of equipment out of Afghanistan between June 21, 2013, and February 2014, using every available means and route. The US once had 600 bases; now it had about 100. Since most US forces were in eastern Afghanistan, Karachi remained the preferred outbound port. The NDN was being used, but it did not lend itself well to the locations of US forces. Materiel was being flown to other countries and then transported by other means.

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‍Logistics remained a sticky problem for the Army. Prior to the invasion, units had their own equipment. When the fighting began, they pooled their equipment. As a result, units returning to the US did not have their equipment with them.

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‍Reports in July 2013 said President Obama was considering withdrawing 100 percent of US forces from Afghanistan by 2014. General Dunford said he was not planning for a “zero option.” He commented, “By the late fall (2013), you've got to know what the size of the force is going to be in the fall of 2014 when you deploy the force in the summer of 2014.” He planned to have a detailed operations plan for 2014 available by late 2013.

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‍Lt. General Mark Milley, the number two ISAF commander, said the US would not withdraw 100 percent by the close of 2014. On September 2, 2013, he said,

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‍“We have no indication whatsoever of a withdrawal completely from Afghanistan. We are going to change our mission, and we are going to reduce in size and scope … The current NATO mandate ends on 31 December 2014, but there’s another mission that follows that’s called Resolute Support which is currently in planning … We haven’t been told to plan for that (US troop levels dropping to zero) … We’re only pulling out of areas where we think the Afghan security forces are capable of standing up and fighting on their own. But even when they ‘fight on their own,’ we are still going to provide limited [intelligence and reconnaissance] and close-air support, because those capabilities won’t be ready for several years.”

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‍Reports surfaced that General Dunford was considering a full withdrawal in 2019, while President Obama seemed to be leaning toward the end of 2014 or sooner. One major problem was that the Taliban was beating up Afghan forces, who were suffering unsustainable losses. Major General Kenneth Wilsback, USAF, deputy commander for U.S. and coalition air operations in Afghanistan, said he planned to provide close air support and would therefore keep his forces in Afghanistan in 2014 and beyond.

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‍President Karzai said he was in no hurry to sign a BSA with the US. He said, “The security pact between Kabul and Washington should guarantee the security of Afghanistan, provide financial support to Afghanistan, and respect the sovereignty and culture of the country.”

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‍The Russians planned to deploy 7,000 troops to bases in Tajikistan, concerned that the US was withdrawing too quickly. By October, this force was said to number 4,000, deployed to three regions in southwest Tajikistan.

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‍Russian concerns were understandable. In late September 2013, it became clear that Afghan troops were facing one of their deadliest fighting seasons, as the Taliban grew more aggressive. American military commanders believed the Afghans could not sustain such losses. The Russians agreed.

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‍In September 2013, the US and Afghan militaries struggled to plan. President Obama was considering a complete withdrawal in 2014, but had not yet decided. President Karzai was in no rush to conclude a BSA.  Logistics planners had to ensure they supported the remaining US forces. The objective was to leave 32,000 of 62,000 US troops in mid-February 2014. The USAF, in turn, planned to continue training until 2017 to build up the Afghan Air Force. 

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‍The USAF adjusted its transport operations so that it flew equipment to Persian Gulf ports for shipment by sea. Afterward, the transports returned to Afghanistan, loaded, and flew again to these ports. In September 2013, the USAF was using twelve C-17s for these round-robin trips.

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‍The Afghan-US BSA negotiations stalled in October 2013 and were not going well. The US needed such an agreement by November to plan for 2014. Afghanistan pushed for the US to stop insurgents coming from Pakistan, but the US was not willing to provide this service after 2014. 

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‍The US wanted a free hand in targeting terrorists. Karzai saw this as an infringement on Afghan sovereignty. Trust broke down, and President Karzai was willing to leave the BSA problem for his successor, due to be elected in 2014. The talks were at an impasse. President Obama threatened that if there was no BSA by October 31, 2013, the US would completely withdraw by the end of 2014.

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‍In a blow to the US, Kyrgyzstan said it would not renew the contract to use its Manas AB when it terminated in July 2014. Manas AB was a central US logistics hub for Afghanistan operations. Romania said in response that the US could use its Mihail Kogalniceanu AB located near the Black Sea. 

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‍During 2012-2013, the US shipped 40,000 containers and 30,000 vehicles out of Afghanistan, and Army logisticians planned to move out another 80,0000 containers and 20,000 vehicles by December 2014. The Army was destroying equipment and vehicles and selling the scrap, and was also turning some over to the ANSF.

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‍In November 2013, General Dempsey, USA, CJCS, said, 

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‍”If security deteriorates to a point where the $6 billion in annual aid promised to Afghanistan dries up, then they can’t survive ... After 2014, Afghanistan can live without a ubiquitous presence of US military forces in the country, but they can't live without any.”

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‍Afghanistan’s Loya Jurga (parliament) reviewed and approved the BSA in November 2013, but President Karzai refused to sign it, still wanting to hand the issue to his successor. US National Security Adviser Rice said,

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‍"Without a prompt signature (to the Bilateral Security Agreement-BSA), the U.S. would have no choice but to initiate planning for a post-2014 future in which there would be no U.S. or NATO troop presence in Afghanistan.” 

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‍Rice was also said to have told President Karzai that the US had finished negotiating. General Dempsey said the same. Secretary of Defense Hagel said in December that a total withdrawal in 2014 was not possible, though he added that he could wait until February 2014 for the BSA to be signed. General Dempsey wanted it signed by December 31, 2013.

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‍Dempsey was worried that Afghanistan could become an “ungoverned space producing havens for terrorism.” Recall that counter terrorism was the reason the US invaded Afghanistan in 2001.

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‍Senior US officials mentioned all kinds of deadlines for the BSA during December. The reality was that the US would wait.

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‍US force levels were on track to decline to 34,000 by February 2014 and would remain at that level until after the April 2014 presidential elections. Afterward, they would continue to fall until December 31, 2014, when the NATO mission would have concluded.

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‍NBC obtained a copy of the BSA and reported that it said the US was prepared to maintain military outposts in Afghanistan for many years and pay to support hundreds of thousands of Afghan security forces.

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‍The US stopped moving cargo through the Karachi port because Pakistani criminals were inspecting the shipments and taking what they wanted..

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‍2014: The witching hour was approaching, still no plan