Taiwan adjustments

DUTY, HONOR, COURAGE, RESILIANCE

Talking Proud: Service & Sacrifice

‍Taiwan: The times are changing

‍Taiwan approaching a new era?

‍Lee Teng-hui

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‍Adjusting US policy

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‍The One China policy has remained in effect since 1972, but is now under pressure because of Chinese aggressiveness toward Taiwan and in the South China Sea (SCS). The US has maintained a position of “strategic ambiguity” with regard to China’s claims on Taiwan. A Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Task Force has suggested the US position of “strategic ambiguity” is “becoming more and more brittle.”

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‍This same task force added,

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‍“A conflict between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China) over Taiwan is becoming increasingly imaginable.”

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‍The US National Security Strategy (NSS) was published in November 2025. It said that the US economic relationship with China is unbalanced and that the objective now is to rebalance it. The NSS states that the US “will build a military capable of denying aggression anywhere in the First Island Chain.”

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‍The first island chain extends from the Japanese archipelago, the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, the northern Philippines, and Borneo.

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‍If such aggression were to occur, the US in one form or another would be involved. The question now is, how involved is the US defense community with Taiwan?

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‍There is cause to believe US policy toward Taiwan is changing.

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‍The National Defense Strategy of 2026 says, “we will erect a strong denial defense along the First Island Chain (FIC).”

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‍Deterring China from dominating the Indo-Pacific region is a priority, behind only defense of the US Homeland.

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‍The Congress is on board. The US 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) stipulated that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, will strengthen the US-Taiwan defense relationship and accelerate Taiwan’s modernization of its defense capabilities. It said that the modernization should enable Taiwan to delay, degrade, and deny Chinese coercive or grey zone activities, a Chinese blockade, a takeover of Taiwanese territory, or its leadership.

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‍The objective is to prevent China from projecting military power beyond its coastline. The loss of Taiwan would significantly add to the degree of difficulty in the US conducting military operations in the region.

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‍There are several reports published in the last few years that underscore how brittle “strategic ambiguity” is, a policy which some propose should be changed to “strategic clarity.”

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‍First, Guy D. McCardie wrote in July 2025 that the US has embarked on a historic shift in military collaboration with Taiwan. He labeled this move as “groundbreaking … underscoring the deepening military ties between the United States and Taiwan.”

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‍McCardie said that US Army Special Operations Forces (SOF) have been stationed at Taiwanese Army amphibious command centers in Kinmen and Penghu, the most significant US military presence in Taiwan in over 40 years. Kinmen is only six miles from the Chinese coastline, and Penghu is about 100 miles east of the Chinese coast. The Penghu or Pescadores Islands are an archipelago of 90 islands and islets in the Taiwan Strait, about 25 miles west of Taiwan’s main island.

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‍I need to pause for a moment. I’m getting old, but I remember the days as a youngster when China was bombarding Quemoy and Matsu Islands with artillery in the mid-to-late 1950s. Quemoy is now named Kinmen. The Matsu Islands are an archipelago of 36 islands and islets just offshore China.

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‍This confrontation had whispers of a nuclear crisis in the making. The US helped resupply the islands and sent fighter aircraft to Taiwan. US Navy ships escorted ROC supply convoys to the islands. And the US supplied the ROC with fighter aircraft and missiles, strategic air defense missiles, and artillery. I recall watching the battles in TV.

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‍McCardie reported that Taiwan has two Taiwanese Army amphibious command centers operated by the 101st Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion (ARB-101st). It is basically a frogman unit. The ROC Ministry of National Defense (MND) has been upgrading both centers.

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‍The Taiwan News reported in 2019 that the upgrades are “to assist in the rapid deployment of Frogman units in the Taiwan Strait.” It also said “the new forward bases planned for the ARB-101st are the result of strategic consultations with U.S. military officials.”

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‍I’ll mention as an aside that US Special Forces with South Vietnamese frogmen aboard went into North Vietnamese waters during the US Vietnam War, dispatched them into harbors with a view toward their blowing up ships berthed there. The US had some special arrangements with Taiwan at the time to train these Vietnamese in Taiwan.

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‍Furthermore, McCardie added that a Special Operations Forces Liaison Element (SOFLE) had been set up in Taoyuan’s Longtan District in southwest Taipei City, the location of Taiwan’s Army headquarters. He reported that the SOFLE was coordinating all US Special Forces activities in Taiwan and that small teams of about three Green Berets were conducting the training.

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Table of Contents

Introduction

US in Taiwan, prior to Shanghai

Shanghai Communiqué of 1972

Adjusting US policy

Joint Firepower Coordination Centre

C-C5ISRT for Taiwan?

Where are we now?

McCardie said it was notable that the Green Berets are training the Taiwanese to use the Black Hornet Nano Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). This is termed a Personal Reconnaissance System (PRS). It can be held with two or three fingers, weighs about one to two ounces, depending on the version used, and is 6.6. inches in length. They can fly for 25-30 minutes and are designed to provide surveillance results to squad and small units.

This micro-UAV has a high-resolution Thermal Imager (TI) and an Electro-Optical (EO) camera with exceptional low-light capabilities. It has an obstacle avoidance capability. Its miniature propulsion system, such as electric motors, is powered by a field replaceable battery. It is believed to be stealthy and very quiet.

News outlets throughout the region picked up on McCardie’s report and repeated it as though they were guaranteeing its authenticity. The SOF Support Foundation also published McCardie’s article.

It has been widely known that US forces periodically train Taiwanese forces, but on a rotational basis rather than a permanent basis. The point is sort of moot since the rotations frequently occur from Okinawa, Japan, to Taiwan and back, then back to Taiwan, etc. The question of permanent US military forces in Taiwan would mark a significant change in US policy and would certainly anger China.

I’ll also note that Wendell Minnick has written,

“Besides Kinmen and Penghu, Green Berets are anchored with Taiwan’s Army Aviation Special Forces Command (ASFC), Army Special Service Company (ASSC), Airborne Training Center, and Special Warfare Mountain Training Center.”

US and Taiwanese officials have handled these reports with “kid gloves,” and have publicly rejected the reports without saying precisely what they are rejecting.

In May 2025, Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery, USN (Ret.), speaking to the House Select Committee (HSC) on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), said that the US has as many as 500 US defense trainers in Taiwan. Montgomery was the senior director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation. Furthermore, he was a co-leader of FDD’s Air and Missile Defense Program. He told the HSC-CCP,

“We absolutely have to grow the joint training team in Taiwan. That’s a US team there. That’s about 500 people. Now it needs to be 1,000 if we’re going to give them billions of dollars in assistance, tens of billions of dollars’ worth of US gear.”

News outlets pounced on the number “500” as a result.

Montgomery did not say whether those 500 were active-duty military, reservists, or civilians, and he did not say whether they were rotational or permanent.

In March 2024, Micah McCartney reported for Newsweek that “Taiwan has confirmed there are U.S. troops stationed on its islands in the Taiwan Strait on a permanent basis.”

However, I am not sure how McCartney supports that. When asked about this, he quoted Taiwanese defense chief Chiu Kuo-cheng telling reporters on March 14, 2024,

“No matter the situation, there may be blind spots or shortcomings. So we need to communicate with our allies—whether it is a team, a group, or a country. We can learn from each other to see what strengths we have. This is a fixed thing.”

McCartney interpreted that statement to confirm that US Green Berets were in Taiwan on a permanent basis. That strikes me as a bit of a stretch.

Newsweek’s McCartney went on to say that there were also US troops in the northeast city of Taoyuan on the main island, training Taiwanese forces on drones. I assume he was referring to the micro-UAVs, though he could have meant the RQ-9 Reapers.

Taken all together, these reports, if true, would mark a substantial change in US policy. I do not doubt there are US military forces in Taiwan training its military forces. The open question is whether they are rotational, on temporary duty, or whether their assignments are permanent, and then how many?

A question arose from the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) in April 2023 as to whether the US had any military forces permanently stationed in Taiwan, I assume beyond the Marines protecting the AIT in Taipei. Admiral John Aquilino, USN, commander Indo-Pacom, responded and rejected the notion that the US is stationing forces in Taiwan permanently. Admiral Aquilio said,

“Congressman, first let me just say the article is incorrect. There is no permanent stationing of US forces there (in Taiwan). It is just inherently inaccurate.”

Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs North American Affairs Department Director-General Wang Liang-yug would not comment on the content of the SOFREP report.

Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen in 2021 was the first Taiwanese leader to publicly acknowledge that US troops had deployed to Taiwan. Wil Ripley of CNN, on October 27, 2017, interviewed President Tsai and asked,

“Does that (military) support include sending some US service members to help train Taiwanese troops?”

President Tsai responded,

“Well, yes, well, we have a wide range of cooperation with the US.”

Ripley: “How many US service members are deployed in Taiwan right now?”

Tsai: “Um, not as many as people thought.”

This is obviously a hot-button issue.

There is now also a January 27, 2026 report that says the US and Taiwan have established a Joint Firepower Coordination Centre in Taipei “to receive intelligence from the U.S. Joint Digital Firepower System, and for U.S. forces to select targets and finalising attack plans jointly with local forces.” This report said the US people would be permanently stationed at the centre.

Defense Minister Wellington Koo promptly rejected media reports that a new US-Taiwan joint coordination center would see US forces "supervise" the actions of Taiwanese troops. His response could imply that there is such a center and that US military personnel work in it, whether rotational or permanent.

NBC reported that Sun Li-fang, a spokesperson for the Taiwanese National Defense Ministry, has acknowledged that “the U.S. and Taiwan have advanced their cooperation with an intelligence sharing deal that Sun called a ‘game-changer.’”

All the reports I have mentioned here are significant, very significant if they are true. I subscribe to the idea that where there is smoke, there is fire.

I want to zero in on the report about a Joint Firepower Coordination Centre. The potential that might form around it are fascinating

Joint Firepower Coordination Centre