Talking Proud: Service & Sacrifice
Taiwan: The times are changing
Taiwan approaching a new era?
Joint Firepower Coordination Centre
There is a January 27, 2026 report that says the US and Taiwan have established a Joint Firepower Coordination Centre in Taipei “to receive intelligence from the U.S. Joint Digital Firepower System, and for U.S. forces to select targets and finalising attack plans jointly with local forces.”
This coordination center is thought be located in the Zhongsheng District of Taipei, close to the Presidential Office Building on Bo’ia Road.
Let’s keep in mind that the term”joint” technically means people of more than one military service work in the center. Technically, it does not mean the US military is there, though reporters tend to use the term to mean just that. If US troops were working at the center full-time, then the center would more properly be named “Combined” and possibly “Combined Joint” if more the one nation and more than one military service were involved. But I’ll leave these distinctions for another day.
As said in the previous section, a spokesman for the Ministry of Defense acknowledged that “the U.S. and Taiwan have advanced their cooperation with an intelligence sharing deal that (he) called a ‘game-changer.’”
I am going to go out on a limb, actually way out on the limb in this section and suggest that this is a huge topic in the context of US military support to Taiwan.
Taiwan has a robust surface-to-surface and air-to-surface missile inventory, most of which its people designed and manufactured, and most of which is defensive, short-range, less than 150 miles. However, Taiwan is developing a new missile, the Sun Feng, which may have a range of as much as 1,200 miles.
In 2024, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) issued a report about US military support for Taiwan, outlining the weapons Taiwan has acquired from the US. The list includes the High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), Harpoon and Stinger missile systems, and Javelin anti-tank missiles. Taiwan has received 11 of 29 HIMARS. The HMARS has a range from 50 miles to 186 miles depending on the variant.
Let’s add the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). In December 2025, the US approved over 400 ATACMS missiles for Taiwan, in addition to those previously approved. It is said to have a range of up to 300 miles.
The dominant challenge is to precisely target this robust missile lineup. That’s where a Joint Firepower Coordination Centre is needed. This is where I step out on the limb.
The report I mentioned earlier said the Joint Firepower Coordination Centre in Taipei was “to receive intelligence from the U.S. Joint Digital Firepower System.”
I have not been able to identify the US Joint Digital Firepower System, but I think this is a reference to the US Joint Fire Network (JFN). The Military Defense Advocacy Alliance (MDAA) describes the JDN,
“A cornerstone of the JFN is its ability to facilitate seamless communication and data exchange between various platforms, including ground units, aircraft, naval vessels, and unmanned systems … Additionally, the JFN leverages state-of-the-art sensors, analytics, and machine learning algorithms to provide unparalleled targeting accuracy, crucial for tracking and engaging dynamic and elusive targets. This integration reduces the risk of collateral damage and increases mission success rates.”
That is a mouthful. In short, that translates to the US providing Taiwan with targeting data for its missile systems. This would be significant in my view.
I’ve been doing some educated guessing here that has put me out on a limb. Let me climb out further and address something known as C-C5ISRT.
C-C5ISRT for Taiwan?
Do you have a headache yet? What is C-C5ISRT, you ask?
It’s an abbreviation for Counter-Command, Control, Computing, Communications, Cyber, Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Targeting.
BCE Consulting of Boston has posted a paper, “C5ISRT and the Future of Convergence Warfare.” It says,
“This dizzying array of new terminology mirrors the internal upheaval underway in the Pentagon, where military leaders are attempting to articulate the rapidly evolving nature of warfare.”
BCE submits that “Encapsulating all these acronyms is the big one: The Joint Warfighting Concept, or JWC. With its emphasis on networks, data sharing, and integrated fires, the Joint Warfighting Concept heralds a convergence of sensors, systems, and services, and ultimately, a convergence of mission areas.”
BCE has contracts with the US Director of National Intelligence (DNI), the USAF, and the US Army.
I was once involved with C3CM, Command, Control, Communications Countermeasures, and found it tough to deal with, though we did. So now we are C-C5ISRT!
I would be tempted to disregard this alphabet-soup, but I bumped into testimony by Admiral Samuel Paparo, Jr., USN, the current US commander Indo-Pacom. Taiwan is in his area of responsibility. He said the following during his confirmation hearings with the Senate,
“It (C-C5ISRT) has been the number one priority that I’ve communicated to the chief of naval operations in my integrated priority lists. And if confirmed, it is the enabling capability … that will bring victory to the allies.
“Specifically, the joint force requires capabilities to blind, see, and kill.”
The Senate committee asked Admiral Paparo to identify the key areas where the US military must improve. Part of his written response was,
“Specifically, the joint force requires capabilities to blind (Counter-Command, Control, Computing, Communications, Cyber, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Targeting (C-C5ISRT), see (persistent real-time awareness of the battle-space in all domains), and kill (long-range precision fire enabled the Joint Fires Network). Additionally, we require capabilities that assure air superiority, sea control, undersea warfare dominance, space control, integrated air and missile defense, and logistics to support our distributed operations. If confirmed, I look forward to working cooperatively with each service regarding these capabilities.”
I was stunned that a four-star admiral would talk in these kinds of terms. I remember the days in the 1960s-1970s when senior military officers belittled the use of intelligence in combat. Admiral Paparo is clearly not one of those.
To get some level of understanding of this “monster,” let’s break it down. I’ll start with “ISR,” Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance.”
Falling back on Admiral Paparo, he has said the challenge with ISR is that often we get only a “blink” of the situation we face. He said,
“The closer we can come to a persistent stare from the seabed to the surface of the sea, distributed throughout geography, in the air and in the [space] constellation — all of it must sum to a persistent stare of (opposing) forces in response to this shrinking strategic, operational and tactical warning.”
So the admiral is seeking a “persistent stare” at opposing forces, no matter where they are, rather than merely obtaining a “blink.” That is a tall order. To start, multiple, even myriad intelligence sources are needed to obtain that breadth of coverage, not to mention accelerating the speed at which the information is available and to whom it will be made available.
This is the job of the US Joint Fire Network (JFN),
“The ability to facilitate seamless communication and data exchange between various platforms, including ground units, aircraft, naval vessels, and unmanned systems … Additionally, the JFN leverages state-of-the-art sensors, analytics, and machine learning algorithms to provide unparalleled targeting accuracy, crucial for tracking and engaging dynamic and elusive targets. This integration reduces the risk of collateral damage and increases mission success rates.”
I’ll suggest that it is a big deal if the US is helping Taiwan walk toward these goals. Far-fetched? Maybe. Once again, where there’s smoke, there’s a fire.
Where are we now?
US policy continues to hold a One China theme. The US has acknowledged that China believes Taiwan to be part of China, but has not endorsed that position. This theme remains in play so long as the Taiwanese people are able to chart their own course. The US has told China its expects that China-Taiwan relations will be solved peacefully. US policy toward Taiwan does not require the US to defend Taiwan.
However, the US maintains a “robust unofficial relationship” with Taiwan. This relationship is becoming more robust as China is becomes more aggressive toward Taiwan, especially by engaging in repeated non-combat operations designed to wear down Taiwan, called “Gray Zone”activities targeted at Taiwan.
The US and Taiwan are in a bit of “Catch-22” situation. They perceive China is becoming more aggressive, so they build up Taiwan’s defenses, which causes China to get more aggressive. And the beat goes on.
The US strategy toward Taiwan has been called the “Porcupine Strategy,” which enables Taiwan to make a Chinese attack very costly to China such that a smaller, weaker Taiwan can inflict exceptional damage on China. The hope is that this will deter China from attacking.
This leaves the challenges posed by China’s gray zone activities. There are multiple papers prepared by experts recommending Taiwan demonstrate to China that its gray zone activities are not working and that China is not gaining very much from engaging in them.
The US is committed to building up Taiwan’s defenses. Whether the US would intervene militarily if China attacked remains an open question, and centers on whether the US sees Taiwan as a vital national interest. Arguments are on both sides of this question.
Michael Swaine argues that no, Taiwan is not a vital national interest for the US. He sees a war with China as “cataclysmic,” one which would damage the global economy. He argues further it is questionable whether the US could win such a war. He does not believe in the “first island chain” argument, asserting Taiwan has no strategic value. There are many distinguished scholars who opine this way.
Most do agree that Taiwan is important to the US, but stop short of going to war with China over it.
Chris Rahman says Taiwan is a vital national interest for the US. His argument centers on “maintaining order in maritime East Asia.” He ties it to Japan as a vital national interest. He sees a linkage between Japan’s and Taiwan’s security and advocates the US seeking a geopolitical balance in the region.
The bottom line, however, seems well written by Michael E. O'Hanlon, who says,
“A U.S.-China war must never be fought.”
The US National Security Strategy of 2026 seeks to obtain a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region. The US intends to “erect a strong denial defense along the First Island Chain,” which includes Taiwan.
The question of whether the US has sent military troops to Taiwan strikes me as unimportant at this stage. Yes, of course the US sends military troops to Taiwan. They go there to advise and train. They also go there to do what has to be done to establish Taiwan as a “lily pad” for greater US levels of military activity on the island, a soft place to land US forces and capabilities if such a decision is made. Are US troops in Taiwan permanently or temporarily seems moot to me, though I appreciate it is not a moot point for China.
My experience with sending troops abroad temporarily often means rotate them in, pull them out, and send them back in or send a different bunch in etc. Either way they are there. The US-Taiwan relationship is a long way from reincarnating the US Taiwan Defense Command with all its attendant operational forces on the island. However, the lily pad idea would enable US combat forces to set down on Taiwan if needed.
Back to Introduction
Table of Contents
US in Taiwan, prior to Shanghai
Shanghai Communiqué of 1972
Joint Firepower Coordination Centre
C-C5ISRT for Taiwan?
Where are we now?
