Talking Proud: Service & Sacrifice
Tien Sha: Covert Navy to North Vietnam
“Launch guerrilla operations into North Vietnam territory”
President John F. Kennedy
Tien Sha Peninsula
While the August 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution clearly marks the distinction between covert and overt actions, as you've already seen, the US was engaging in mischief in Indochina long before August 1964.
I've been surprised by how many articles on the internet discuss covert maritime activities by the US and RVN on the Tien Sha Peninsula. It’s mind-boggling to go through these and examine all the operations launched from there, along with their code names. I find most of the articles credible, many written by men who were actually there doing what they claim. I’ll only scratch the surface.
The Naval Advisory Detachment (NAD) was activated in Da Nang in January-February 1964. NAD served as a cover for MACSOG and was known as SOG-34, using the number 34 from OPLAN 34A. Its mission was to conduct covert maritime operations against NVN.
NAD effectively was a conversion of CIA’s Tien Sha Peninsula Maritime Operations (MAROPS) to an entity in the DoD chain, to wit, MACSOG/NAD. To my knowledge, the men in the CIA’s MAROPs were mainly Navy SEALs.
In short, Da Nang’s Tien Sha Peninsula was used by US naval fast patrol boats (PTFs) on missions to the NVN.
I’ll note that NAD was separate from the Naval Support Activity (NSA), Da Nang, which was a logistics organization.
The NAD headquarters was located at the foot of Monkey Mountain on Tien Sha Peninsula on the northeast side of Da Nang AB. A SEAL base was set up in 1965 and became known as Camp Tien Sha.
Camp Fay served as living quarters, mess hall, and support areas for all military personnel assigned to the NAD. I have read that upon arriving at NAD’s offices at Camp Fay, the sailors turned in their Navy ID cards and received NAD ID cards instead.
The SEALs berthed at Camp Black Rock. The red arrows roughly highlight a section of My Khe Beach, which was secretly used to house the Vietnamese commandos. Initially, mainly Vietnamese commandos were used, but later on, men from other nations and ethnic groups were involved.
This photo shows the main gate at Camp Tien Sha, but it's undated, so I don’t know when it was built. I know the Seabees built the base on an old French encampment, and I suspect it was completed around 1964 to 1965. I found a blogger who said he was the first to settle at Camp Tien Sha in 1965.
Before moving to the Tien Sha peninsula, the NAD was based at a place called the “White Elephant,” which was an old French hotel in Da Nang city. The Navy used it for various purposes, including as a communications center.
This is a photo of the old elephant. The Navy kept using it even after the NAD left.
This is a great schematic of the lower base and the main base, which handled patrol torpedo and fast boats.
In 1963, the USN modified the PTFs for Vietnam and deployed them to Tien Sha. One of the major modifications was the removal of the torpedo tubes since the Navy felt their targets would be smaller ships not requiring torpedoes. I have also read that all serial numbers, whether on the craft or the guns, were ground off or drilled out. I have also read that the boats arrived in late 1963. The Nastys routinely went to NVN waters under CIA direction to land commandos to conduct raids against NVN installations, as discussed in the previous section.
The NAD building was built in 1965. Offices inside were also used by MAC-SOG and “others.” They were limited, controlled access. Those who were there called it the "Super Spook" building.
There were also buildings for an armory, electronics shop, carpenter shop, machine and electrical shop, boat engine shop, and the ship fitter’s shop. Additionally, there was a warehouse and supply office, a lounge, a latrine (“head”), a sick bay, a generator building, and a fuel farm.
There were four piers for the PTFs,
- Pier One was the primary pier for Nasty-class PTFs in the early days. Floating pier sections were able to berth six boats.
- Pier Two had floating sections used in the early days to berth the “gassers,” PTFs 1 and 2. Later, after these aluminum boats left, the pier was used to berth up to four of the Nasty-class PTFs, which were made of wood.
- Pier Three was a floating pier section off of Pier One, used for small craft and Landing Craft Mechanized (LCM) assigned to the base.
- Pier Four had floating sections used by the NAD’s Swift boats.
There was a cove at the base of Monkey Mountain at which the SEALs set up this small base with finger piers and a floating dry-dock.
PTs 1 and 2, the “gassers,” were never refueled at the pier. They were moved out to the refueling buoy. The 115-octane gas used to power the boats was delivered by a truck through a hose floating on the water. I believe the PTFs that arrived had diesel engines, which lacked spark plugs but instead took in air and compressed it. The heat from the compressed air ignited the fuel in the diesel engine. Therefore, they could be refueled at the piers.
After reading many blogs written by men who were at Camp Tien Sha, I realized it was a bustling camp, larger than you might expect, where men did all sorts of work using various skills. The covert maritime operation in that area was just one of many, and not many people knew what those guys were doing. Additionally, the camp also suffered from numerous enemy attacks. I’ve also come across stories suggesting NVN agents were all around the area, watching. One report mentioned an aircraft overflying the camp and receiving ground fire. The pilot said the place was infested with Viet Cong.
You also will recall that in January 1962, ST-1 sent two men to the RVN, Chief Petty Officer (CPO) Robert Sullivan and CPO Charles Raymond, to conduct initial surveys and prepare to train South Vietnamese to be maritime commandos under a CIA program named “Nautilus.”
Sullivan detailed his experiences, mentioning that the officer in charge of the NAD was Lt. Cathal “Irish” Flynn, and that he had 16 ST-1 SEALs with him, forming a ST-1 detachment — I believe it was Detachment Golf. As an aside, Flynn rose to the rank of rear admiral, as shown in the photo. He was the first active-duty SEAL promoted to flag rank.
Sullivan has written that the site he and CPO Raymond established for CIA’s Operation VULCON in 1962, was located along the beach below Monkey Mountain, had now been expanded. Sullivan, now on his second tour in the RVN, wrote,
“It (the old VULCAN training area) was now a group of five separate training sites spread out along 4 or 5 miles of beach. The Headquarters was on the northern end of the beach, and that was where the SEAL advisors were housed. Each site was separated and segregated to keep the personnel from contact with each other for security reasons. Each site was designated for a specific mission. SEAL personnel were assigned to train a particular group of agents for their mission and only that mission. Usually, there were two SEALs assigned to each group, but in a few cases it took up to four. We had graduated from operating from Junks to ‘Swift Boats,’ and then to the ‘Nasties’ (Norwegian Attack Craft). This was a definite improvement in our speed and armament capability. All the boats were heavily armed.
“Our group of agents came from the remaining Vietnamese trained in Taiwan for the Vietnamese UDT Team, but not chosen for the First ‘VULCAN’ operation. There were twenty of them. There was also an interpreter in the group. He was a noncombatant and used only to explain our English to the group, and their Vietnamese to us. We held a short course with the group on what American Commands that they must know immediately without the need of an interpreter. We didn’t want the need for an interpreter if we were in the middle of a firefight.”
I want to focus on what the SEAL involvement actually was during a raid on the NVN. Sullivan wrote that he and his new partner, Boatswain's Mate Ray Abreu, also a SEAL—who came from UDT-11—were aboard swift boats when they went on raids to the NVN. However, he said they did not disembark onto a rubber Inflatable Boat Small (IBS) with the Vietnamese commandos. Instead, they remained on the swift boat and could tell if the operation was a success by watching and listening to the explosions set off by the commandos on shore, and then seeing which of the commandos survived once they returned to the swift boat.
He also said that NVN’s Shantou-class gunboat, called Swatows, would pursue them, and they would return fire. Sullivan even mentioned that he fired the .50 cal and is confident he “got some good licks in.” Finally, he said the swift boats were operated by a Coxswain and an Engineer, both of whom were contracted personnel, along with Scandinavian Merchant Seamen. The bottom line was that Navy SEALs were in NVN waters.
I highlight the “bottom line” because the question that later emerged was whether the SEALs went into NVN waters and whether they participated in attacks on shore or at berthing facilities on shore.
Steve Edwards, author of “Stalking the Enemy’s Coast,” published by the Navy’s “Proceedings” in February 1992, wrote this:
“...Did U.S. Navy SEALs ever go north on these (OP 34A) missions? The official answers to these questions have always been ‘no’ ...We now know that U.S. Navy SEALs did go up north.
“In a June 1980 interview with the U.S. Naval Institute, Captain Phil H. Bucklew, an almost legendary figure in naval special warfare, addressed the 34A missions specifically: ‘Our SEAL contingents would train Vietnamese SEALs and supervise. They were not allowed to go north of the demarcation line, though they did at times...’”
Edwin Moise, in his book Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War, wrote that US policy clearly forbade the US military from going along on combat missions against the NVN. He wrote,
“Captain Phil H. Bucklew, who as head of the Naval Operations Support Group was responsible for the US Navy personnel in question, believes that they habitually violated the prohibition. Indeed he is not aware of any cases in which PTFs from Da Nang went on combat operations without American personnel aboard.”
Moise added:
“Vice Admiral Roy L. Johnson, commander of the US Seventh Fleet starting in June 1964, recalls that the Vietnamese crews had proved unreliable ... American crews had to be substituted for the Vietnamese. Admiral Johnson is ‘pretty sure’ that American crews were being used on raids against the North Vietnamese coast by August 1964 …”
Moise indicates, however, that some people close to the operation at Da Nang do not agree. For my part, US Navy SEALs did go on OP 34A missions against the NVN, just as USAF F-86 pilots struck across the North Korean border into China chasing MiGs.
On February 12, 1964, General Khanh, the RVN self-proclaimed president, set up the Strategic Technical Service (later named the Strategic Technical Directorate) under the direction of Colonel Tran Van Ho, ARVN, at the RVN’s Ministry of Defense. Its mission was to work closely with MACSOG on covert operations designed to strike at the NVN.
I reiterate, MACSOG did not really belong to MACV, but instead was directed from Washington. MACSOG and the RVN Strategic Technical Service were to execute the instructions coming from Washington. However, each month, MACV was required to submit recommended actions to the DoD, which, after consulting with the White House and State Department, would select the operations to be conducted. DoD retained veto authority over every raid.
In February 1964, the CNO established Boat Support Unit One (BSU-1), part of Naval Operations Support Groups, Pacific. Its mission was to oversee the PTF program and operate high-speed craft supporting Naval Special Warfare Operations alongside UDT and SEAL units. Lt. Bert Knight was the first commander of BSU-1.
Warboats.org has written, “The missions were soon expanded to include all aspects of riverine and restricted water warfare. The PTF program grew rapidly, beginning with four ‘Nasty’ class PTFs in the fall of 1964.”
BSU-1 was soon renamed Mobile Support Team One (MST-1) and was based at Subic Bay, Philippines. It dispatched a detachment to Da Nang in February 1964 to train VNN officers and crews on how to operate and maintain the craft. I believe the Vietnamese operators of the boats were called the Hai-Tuan.
On April 1, 1964, the RVN created the Coastal Security Service (CSS). The CSS was responsible for carrying out all sea commando operations beyond the 17th parallel. This photo depicts CSS commandos at Da Nang in 1964. Additionally, the CSS was under the authority of the RVN’s Strategic Technical Service.
In May 1964, PTFs 3, 4, 5, and 6 arrived in Da Nang. These PTFs were new Norwegian-built wooden hull boats with diesel engines. A total of eight boats were delivered to Da Nang. This is a photo of PTF-3 at Subic Bay, the Philippines.
MACSOG had a team called “Humidor,” OP-33 Psychological Operations (PSYOP). In April 1964, it planned what became known as the “Sacred Sword of Patriotism League” (SSPL). The goal was to create a notional resistance movement operating from a base in the RVN but pretending to be very active in the NVN. The purpose was to scare the NVN leadership and, more importantly, the people there.
On May 27, 1964, a SOG 34 Nasty crew captured a NVN junk boat and six passengers. CIA operated a top-secret resistance training center at Cu Lao Cham island off Da Nang, where the captives were taken for interrogation.
This is a good place to address the “Sacred Sword of Patriotism League” (SSPL) and Paradise Island.
Paradise Island was actually Cu Lao Cham Island off Da Nang, as previously mentioned. It was also known as “DODO” Island. Operations there began in May 1964, serving as a detention center for fishermen captured by the VNN in NVN waters. The captures specifically for the SSPL project were codenamed “Mint,” meaning “Maritime Interdictions.” The SOG used former NVN residents fluent in local dialects to pose as SSPL members and apprehend the fishermen. American SOG members traveled below deck to avoid detection. The SOG Command History states,
"Covert boat and landing team operations were conducted against the coast of North Vietnam to interdict enemy coastal shipping, capture prisoners for interrogations and psychological warfare exploitation, and to force North Vietnam to increase its coastal defenses."
The SSPL members told the fishermen Paradise Island was “liberated territory,” and that the island was a secret training camp for the resistance that would liberate the NVN from the Chinese communists.
Psywarrior.com says MACVSOG documents describe three camps on the island,
“A small camp called DODO was the base for the US personnel (three officers and four enlisted men). The camp was well separated from the other camps and was principally a support base where the US Advisors could communicate with and assist the Vietnamese camp commander.
“The second camp, PHOENIX, was the delivery point for prisoners captured through marine operations. Its capacity was 90 to 150. It was operated by 3 Vietnamese who represented the SSPL and who both interrogated the POWs for SOG intelligence and indoctrinated them with the program of the SSPL.
“The third camp, separated by heavy foliage and several kilometers, was D36, where more thorough indoctrination was conducted. The camp, with a capacity of 50, was reserved for those selected prisoners who had shown a desire to join the SSPL and were to be tasked to perform an intelligence or PSYOP function upon return to NVN.”
The main point here is that the captured fishermen believed Paradise Island was in NVN waters, and that the people interrogating and indoctrinating them were SSPL members of a major resistance movement based in the NVN mountains. Of course, there was no such thing as an SSPL; the entire story was made up, a fabrication. I recommend the Psywarrior.com story to you.
Stavros Atlamazoglou wrote, “This Vietnam War Covert Special Ops Unit Is The Deadliest You Never Heard Of,” commented,
“Extraordinary men and units, such as the Military Assistance Command Vietnam-Studies and Observations Group (MACV-SOG), have fallen through the cracks of America’s consciousness, and are only known to a few old comrades, their families, and a handful of military history enthusiasts.
“SOG operators pulled off some of the most impressive special operations of the entire war; including some that seemed to defy logic itself. As successive U.S. administrations claimed that no American troops were outside South Vietnam, several hundreds of special operations troops fought against all odds, and against an enemy who always enjoyed a numerical advantage that sometimes exceeded a ratio of 1:1000.”
