Talking Proud: Service & Sacrifice
Tien Sha: Covert Navy to North Vietnam
“Launch guerrilla operations into North Vietnam territory”
President John F. Kennedy
Norway’s Nasty Boats
Recall that the RVN PLO, with CIA support, was conducting sea raids into NVN using junks as early as 1956, though these efforts were mostly ineffective.
In September 1962, Special Group 5412 of high-level US officials proposed using US Navy Patrol Torpedo (PT) boats and USN SEALs for covert operations against the NVN. The SEALs’ mission would be to train the RVN forces to carry out such raids.
Navy PTs were a problem. Most of them were out of service. In January 1963, the Navy’s Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) directed the reactivation of two PTs from WWII, designated PT-1 and PT-2. These were aluminum-hulled boats powered by gasoline engines, thought by many to be unfit for duty in Vietnam.
In October 1962, SecDef McNamara expressed to the Secretary of the Navy his “desire that priority attention also be glven to the procurement of foreign-made craft of the PTF category. Specifically, ... I desire that you take initiate action to procure two boats of the Norwegian Navy’s Nasty class. . . .” The Navy designated these as Patrol Torpedo Fast, or PTFs.
In late 1963 SecDef Robert McNamara directed the Navy to assemble a force of American-built Patrol-Torpedo (PT) boats and Nasty class fast-attack boats purchased from Norway, and deploy them to Da Nang.
CIA acquired four Nasty’s for its covert maritime operations at Tien Sha, Da Nang. The Navy bought more, PTF-3 through PTF-23, betting they would be needed for Vietnam once the US went to war there overly.
Carl Schuster has written,
“When the first boats arrived from Norway, the Navy added electronics, a 40 mm cannon on the bow and a 20 mm cannon on each bridge wing. The bow cannon was soon replaced by a .50-caliber machine gun mounted atop an 81 mm mortar. Crews also augmented the boats’ weapons with other guns to meet specific mission requirements. They often carried light anti-tank weapons, M60 machine guns, M79 grenade launchers and recoilless rifles.”
The PTFs solved the PT problem mentioned earlier. However, now there was the question of sending Americans, such as Navy SEALs, above the 17th parallel.
Alessandro Giorgi’s book, Vikings in Vietnam: Norwegian Patrol Boat Captains in CIA Clandestine Operations, states that the CIA recruited Norwegian merchant marine captains and crews to command the Nastys. The CIA hired them through front companies. These Norwegians skippers commanded the boats and transported South Vietnamese commandos, sabotage teams, and combat swimmers to waters off the coast of NVN.
On the surface, there was no American involvment.
Operations Plan 34A
Operations Plan 34A (OPLAN 34A), approved by JFK just before his assassination in November 1963, directed “U.S. forces to engage in covert actions against the NVN, both directly and in support of South Vietnamese troops, to include commando raids and aerial attacks against military and communication facilities, as well as espionage, sabotage, intelligence, and counterinsurgency operations.” These were to be accomplished, wherever possible, “without direct U.S. involvement or in ways that maintain plausible deniability of American involvement.”
In December 1962, the USS Agerholm (DD-826) conducted the ninth DESOTO mission, but this one was off the coast of the NVN. This was the beginning of such missions. The rationale was to support OPLAN 34A.
The concept was for commandos at Tien Sha to conduct nighttime maritime insertion raids into the NVN while the Naval Security Group SIGINT operators aboard a DESOTO mission monitor NVN reactions, support the raids with the resulting intelligence, and help obtain order of battle and capabilities information.
On September 9, 1963, the JCS approved the final version of CINCPAC OPLAN 34-63. It called for increased, covert hit-and-run raids by the RVN Navy (VNN) against NVN, using Vietnamese commandos under U.S. control, supported by U.S. military advisory equipment and training.
On January 24, 1964, President Johnson (LBJ) signed the authorization for OPLAN 34A, which gave the go-ahead for US forces to carry out covert operations in the NVN.
Also on January 24, 1964, the JCS established the MACV Studies and Observation Group (MAC-SOG). Its mission was to carry out OPLAN 34A covert operations across Indochina. The Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (SACSA) in the Pentagon oversaw it, not MACV. It appeared on the MACV organization chart, but that was part of its cover.
In February 1964, management of covert guerrilla operations in the NVN was transferred from the CIA to the DoD.
Also, in July 1964, the focus of the DESOTO missions shifted. They were now aimed at supporting OPLAN 34A; that is, to identify NVN coastal activity in the areas targeted by OPLAN 34A. Additionally, these missions were intended to help identify targets for future kinetic strikes.
The purpose of the DESOTO missions was to provoke a reaction from the NVN, encouraging them to do something that would reveal their naval capabilities and intentions. For example, the patrols aimed to alert coastal radar facilities so they could be identified and to monitor command and control facilities to understand their operations. One of the best ways to achieve this was to be in position when an OPLAN 34A mission was underway in the area.
The fourth DESOTO patrol mission off the coast of NVN was carried out by the USS Maddox (DD-747) in July 1964 for about three days, moving along the NVN shoreline. The Maddox mission was the first to traverse the entire NVN coast, as shown on the map above. Additionally, she operated while OPLAN 34A missions were active, allowing her NSG crew to observe reactions. Moreover, CINCPAC relaxed the restrictions, instructing Maddox to stay eight nautical miles from the coast but permitting her to approach within four miles of any of its islands.
On August 2, 1964, the Maddox engaged in a firefight with NVN patrol boats; the skippers believed the Maddox had been attacked. I will not go into detail except to say that the Maddox called for air support, fired warning shots, maneuvered to avoid torpedoes, attacked the NVN vessels, received air cover on scene, and then withdrew. She had immobilized one NVN patrol boat, which was left burning, and heavily damaged two others, though they were still underway.
On August 3, 1964, President LBJ ordered the Maddox to be reinforced by the USS Turner Joy (DD-951). He sent both ships back to the area. The NVN remained interested but took no hostile action. However, VNN patrol boats did run up the coast and bombarded a radar installation at Vinh Son and a security post at Mui Ron. NVN patrol boats pursued them back toward Da Nang without incident.
Late on the evening of August 4, 1964, President Johnson announced that he had ordered retaliatory air strikes against the North Vietnamese in response to reports of their attacks earlier on U.S. Navy ships in the Gulf of Tonkin.
On August 7, 1964, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, authorizing President Johnson to take any necessary measures to retaliate and to support the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia. LBJ signed the resolution on August 10, 1964, and the US officially went to war against the NVN.
This explains why the CIA bought the first four PTFs and the Navy purchased the rest, and it clarifies why Norwegian crews commanded them, followed by the Navy SEALs. Before the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, the CIA operated the PTFs covertly; after the resolution, the USN operated them as a military wartime effort.
Go to Tien Sha Peninsula: Section 3
