‍Hainan to Singapore: South China Sea

‍From American dominance to a balance of power

‍New strategic relationships

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‍New strategic relationships

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‍Vietnam’s, Singapore’s, and Malaysia’s power will substantially increase. 

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‍Along with everything else, we have to consider India. Its power will grow, and there is always the chance it will come face-to-face with China in a confrontation. 

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‍Robert Kaplan suggests that a new strategic arrangement will evolve in Asia that employs two concentric triangles,

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• Outer triangle: Japan, South Korea, India, and Australia
• Inner triangle: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam, each with strong ties to India

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‍I found it noteworthy that Kaplan did not include the Philippines or Taiwan in the two concentric circles.

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‍Chinese “Red Line?”

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‍Robert Kaplan has written, based on a conversation with a Chinese Foreign Ministry official about 12 years ago,

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‍“(China) will not tolerate a coalition of smaller powers allied with the United States against it; that, given the Chinese historical experience of the past two hundred years, is unacceptable.”

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‍So, “Houston, there is a problem.” 

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‍Most of the countries surrounding the SCS want a strong US naval and air presence, though they do not want to sever ties with China or entangle themselves in alliances with the US. But they do present China with a “coalition of smaller powers” who, for the time being, rely heavily on a strong US naval presence in the SCS.

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‍Kaplan believes the US seeks a new, rules-based world order, while China seeks a regional order dominated by China.

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‍Last thoughts

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‍China will most certainly continue its military buildup and expand its capacity to project power, both economically and militarily. Southeast Asian states can accept this as a given.

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‍The countries involved are unlikely to reach an agreement to resolve their island-reef disputes. It is also unlikely that the US and China will go to war over these disputes alone. The question is whether the US and China can achieve a balance of power in the West Pacific. That question assumes you accept that US dominance in Westpac is in decline as China’s grows.

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‍ASEAN member states are each other’s largest trading partners. In late 2025, ASEAN upgraded and expanded its China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, known as CAFTA 3.0. Total bilateral trade is estimated to exceed $1 trillion.

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‍ASEAN member states seem to recognize that the times are changing and are raising questions about the reliability of American naval and air power in Westpac. For the moment, Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines seem to be counting on a continued strong American presence.

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‍Many of them are wisely hedging their bets. They are improving their relationships abroad, strengthening their international networks, and building up their own defenses, a trend that is certainly true of Vietnam and Singapore. 

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‍Some, such as Thailand, are moving closer to China.

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‍I look for Australia and India to increase their roles.

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‍While China’s influence over the SCS is growing, India’s influence could rise to match it. Kaplan believes this is especially likely if China falters. He wrote,

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‍“The South China Sea may once again live up to its French colonial description of Indochina, where China competes on an equal—rather than a dominant—footing with India and other powers and civilizations.”

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‍Ancient China grew from many small, isolated communities into multiple organized states and, eventually, a single organized state. There is always the possibility that it will fragment again.

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‍Georgetown University reminds us of a historical novel, The Three Kingdoms, attributed to Luo Guanzhong in the 15th century, whose opening line reads,

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‍“The Empire, Long Divided, Must Unite; Long United, Must Divide.”

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‍Return to Introduction

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