Hainan to Singapore: South China Sea
From American dominance to a balance of power
New strategic relationships
Vietnam
Moving forward, now is a good time for we Americans to set aside our Indochina War experiences.
Vietnam has a 1,900-mile coastline along the SCS, which is home to one-third of its population, though part of the North coast is blocked by China’s Hainan Island.
According to Kaplan, Vietnam’s leadership will not accept China’s 9-dash line. Vietnam has been leading the charge against China’s expansion in the SCS and claims sovereignty over the Spratly and Paracel Islands.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has produced an Island Tracker which presents satellite imagery of islands and reefs in the South China Sea (SCS) that China and other countries claim. I commend it to you.
CSIS analysts note that,
“Vietnam occupies between 49 and 51 outposts spread across 27 features in the South China Sea. These include facilities built on 21 rocks and reefs in the Spratly Islands, along with 14 isolated platforms.”
Vietnam has built a major runway on Barque Canada Reef and Spratly Island and maintains a significant presence on those and multiple other reefs. It also has helipads on the “isolated platforms.”
Chinese influence is most noticeable in northern Vietnam. Vietnam, like so many other countries in the region, depends on China. Kaplan says Vietnam has strong military ties with China. That said, the Vietnamese are sensitive to the many times China has invaded their country. The truth is, there is no love lost between China and Vietnam.
Vietnam is especially concerned about the submarine pens in caves on Hainan Island.
It has purchased six Kilo-class submarines from Russia. It has also invested in the deep-water port at Cam Ranh Bay, hoping the USN will use it to counter China’s growing naval presence in the SCS.
Vietnam has a strong military that is growing stronger through modernization. While its army is the largest, it is shifting toward greater maritime awareness and security. It is importing US weapons. The USN is making port calls in Vietnamese waters.
Vietnam seeks increased US presence in the SCS, but make no mistake, it is wary of the US. There are some within Vietnam’s government who still distrust the US and worry that the US poses a threat to their communist authority.
Zachary Abuza, a professor at the National War College in Washington, has opined that Vietnamese leaders view China as a regional threat and the US as an existential one. For now, according to Kaplan, these leaders are opting to make Vietnam a regional power.
It published a Defense White Paper in 2019. The US International Trade Administration noted Vietnam’s “four no’s,” which speak volumes.
- “No military alliances;
- “no siding with one country against another;
- “no foreign military bases or use of Vietnamese territory to oppose other countries;
- “and no use of force or threat of the use of force in international relations.
Malaysia
Malaysia consists of two main territories, the Malay Peninsula and the island of Borneo, separated by the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
Malaysia is inhabited mainly by Muslims, Chinese, and Indians. Kaplan describes it as “a pulsating demographic and economic microcosm of maritime Asia.” Its population has been gravitating toward cities, especially Kuala Lumpur.
Malaysia’s economy depends heavily on China, but friction has arisen. It has maintained a solid relationship with China while cozying up to the West, adopting a form of “strategic ambiguity.”
Singapore’s intense military modernization has prompted Malaysia to build up as well, with US support. However, it has no desire to confront China, even though it is aware that China has supported communist insurgents.
Malaysia, like Singapore, seeks a balance of power between China and the United States.
The country’s military consists of about 115,000 active-duty troops and 50,000 in the reserves. About 80,000 of those are in the army. It is said to excel at jungle warfare and has experience fighting communist insurgents. The military does not employ conscription.
Its navy is acquiring second-generation patrol vessels, French submarines, and littoral ships. It has a top-tier shipbuilding industry. The air force operates a mix of American, European, and Russian Sukhoi aircraft.
Malaysia has benefited from a five-nation defense compact that includes Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore. The goal is to develop doctrine, improve cooperation, and train through exercises.
USN ships frequently visit Malaysia, and American submarines call at ports in Borneo. Borneo has become a place where Malaysia’s air force can best defend its interests in the Spratly Islands.
The Lowy Institute reported in June 2025 that,
"Beneath the radar, Malaysia is quietly strengthening its military presence in the Malaysian Borneo states of Sabah and Sarawak.”
Chinese vessels have been operating within Malaysia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), particularly near the Luconia Shoals off the coast of Borneo.
Lowry commented,
“Malaysian Navy’s Squadron 503, operating U.S.-supplied ScanEagle unmanned surveillance and reconnaissance aerial vehicles, is based in Sabah … Sarawak hosts the new air force’s No. 3 Squadron, which operates AW 139 helicopters that can provide logistical and airlift support.”
The Malaysian Air Force (MAF) has also enhanced its long-range surveillance capabilities using US and French radars. Japan has helped build the Malaysian Coast Guard.
All that notwithstanding, the Asia Sentinel has written,
“Once the pride of the British Commonwealth countries, the Malaysian military is today the region’s weakest. It is riddled with corruption, poor planning, and interference by political leaders in procurement, no longer a potent force even in managing low-level intensity conflict.”
Table of Contents
- Introduction
- Hainan: A fortress
- Singapore: At the chokepoint
- Vietnam
- Malaysia
- Philippines
- Japan
- South Korea
- New strategic relationships
- China’s “Red Line?”
- Last thoughts
Philippines
That brings us to the Philippines. The US has a mutual defense treaty with the Philippines. Currently, the US-Philippines relationship is very good, but it has not always been so.
On December 27, 1991, President Corazon Aquino's Philippine government told the US to remove its military forces from the country, largely due to Filipino concerns about “colonial dominance.” Clark Air Base had been heavily damaged by a volcanic eruption, and operations at Subic Bay Naval Base had been disrupted. Congress was reluctant to resurrect Clark but hoped to keep Subic Bay.
The US closed both, but in 1999, agreements were made governing the status of US forces that might be in the country on rotational assignments. President Rodrigo Duterte ended these agreements in 2020, hoping to move the Philippines closer to Russia and China.
In 2022, Duterte retracted his termination of the 1999 agreements, and the Philippines-US alliance once again took hold. US and Filipino special forces conducted a major exercise in the SCS and across the country, known as Balkitan 2025.
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby spoke in Manila on August 10, 2026. He emphasized that the US sought increased contributions from its allies and partners. He said Asia is “of paramount importance,” and that the US seeks “Asia free of hegemony … (where the US will) maintain a favorable balance of power … (and) a posture of deterrence by denial along the first island chain.”
The First Island China is a series of strategic Pacific archipelagos stretching from the Kuril Islands and Japan through Taiwan and the northern Philippines to Borneo.
Colby said,
“Here in the Philippines, our alliance is undergoing historic modernization.”
To this end, the US seeks a Philippines capable of defending itself, even as the US has sent four USCG Fast Response cutters to help the Philippines patrol and secure its EEZ.
Robert Kaplan is not so sanguine about the Philippines, saying “the Philippine capital, Manila is, one of aesthetic and material devastation … Asian dynamism has, at least so far, bypassed the Philippines.”
Kaplan goes on,
“Despite a century’s worth of vast annual outlays of American aid, the Philippines has remained among the most corrupt, dysfunctional, intractable, and poverty-stricken societies in maritime Asia, with Africa-like slums and Latin America-style fatalism and class divides.”
One problem for the Philippines is that it is an archipelago of over 7,000 islands. Luzon in the north and Mindanao in the south are the two largest. Mindanao is largely Muslim and has more in common with Malaysia and Indonesia than with Luzon. Parts of this Islamic population seek autonomy for Mindanao and even the creation of a separate Islamic state.
The islands have some 22,000 miles of coastline, and, as Kaplan notes, these are hard to defend and are the scene of internal discord.
The Philippines is in a tough spot. On the one hand, it has to deal with China, while on the other, it has to rely on the US and, to a lesser extent, on Australia.
Despite Filipino claims to the SCS reefs and islands, the US is unlikely to go to war with China over these claims, though it will, in some fashion, stand up for the Philippines. Sending the Fast Response USCG cutters to Westpac is an example.
Those who study the SCS region argue that one must include Japan and South Korea in the outlook. Let’s take a quick look.
Japan
Japan will likely emerge in the years ahead with enhanced air and sea power. It released its annual white paper, “Defense of Japan,” on August 4, 2026. Japan regards the US as a “key pillar” of its national security strategy.
It views China as an “unprecedented and greatest strategic challenge.” It expresses concern about China’s activities in the East China Sea, the area around the Senkaku Islands, the Sea of Japan, the Taiwan Strait, and Westpac, including the SCS.
The Japanese are also attentive to North Korea, seeing it as a “more grave and imminent threat to Japan’s national security than ever before.” Russian military expansion in its Far East and its strategic partnership with China are strong security concerns, as is Russia’s building partnership with North Korea.
Japan is maintaining its constitutional defensive posture, but its leaders seek to transform Japan’s defense capabilities. It advocates a “free and open Indo-Pacific” and intends to accelerate its defense initiatives.
It intends to assume primary responsibility for defense against the threat of invasion, including the many islands within its EEZ. If the Japanese mean it, this will be a major security shift. Grant Newsham has cautioned, however, that Japan is unlikely to be able to fight a major war.
The 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with the US permits US forces to be stationed in Japan, indicating the US would help defend Japan if it were attacked and would provide Japan with a “nuclear umbrella.”
If Japan were truly able to shoulder its defense largely on its own, that would be a major change, freeing up US resources to focus on other matters and giving Japan greater flexibility and freedom of movement.
Bringing in new, advanced technologies and building its defense production base are central to Japan’s defense transformation.
Legis1, a congressional network, has said,
“Japan is fundamentally reshaping its military and intelligence infrastructure after decades of constrained defense policies. The changes signal Tokyo's intent to shoulder greater security responsibilities in the Indo-Pacific.”
This will worry China a great deal.
South Korea
South Korea has long maintained one of the most potent militaries in the world. The US has a Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of Korea (ROK) and has nearly 30,000 military personnel stationed throughout the country.
The US-ROK relationship is changing. The US and ROK are transitioning from US operational control of all forces through the Combined Forces Command (CFC) to ROK control. This means a ROK general officer would have full command authority.
The plan is for the ROK to assume primary responsibility for deterring and defending against North Korea, with reduced US support. It plans to increase defense spending to 3.5%.
Furthermore, the ROK’s defense industry is fast becoming a “go-to” source for purchasing weapons, air, naval, and ground. It is now the world’s 10th largest global defense exporter.
Those who worry about these things might suggest that in the future the Koreas might unify, challenge Japan, and that the US would have to intercede. I think this is unlikely.
Go to next section: New strategic relationship, Chinese “Red Line,” Last thoughts
