Tanker War

‍Persian Gulf: A 1980s shooting gallery

‍Iranians liked to attack in swarms

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‍Introduction

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‍At this writing, the US has been at war with Iran since February 28, 2026. The US Navy (USN) is blockading maritime traffic to and from Iran. Furthermore, the USN faces the prospect of escorting ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Finally, the question of Iranian nuclear enrichment remains unresolved, raising the possibility of a US land incursion of sorts.

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‍Back in the late 1980s, when Iran and Iraq were engaged in a lengthy war, called by many the “Tanker War,” American military forces had cause to fight the Iranians in the Persian Gulf. I found it instructive to view this in light of what’s happening now.

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‍I’ve noted that the current USN blockade of Iran is occurring in the Gulf of Oman, outside the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf, rather than inside the Persian Gulf.

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‍That strikes me as smart. American planners learned in the 1980s that operations in the Persian Gulf can become congested during a naval fight. It’s not like being out in the open ocean; instead, it’s confined, leaving little time for decision-making. Dwight John Zimmerman has described the Persian Gulf this way,

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‍“A narrow valley in a long canyon dotted with numerous looming promontories. The combination of shallow depth with numerous islands, shoals, and oil platforms restricts deep-draft traffic to a few well-charted passages … The result is a shooting gallery-style gauntlet more than 600 miles long from which Iran could stage attacks.”

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‍In 1979, the Shah of Iran fell, and the US began planning for non-NATO contingencies in Southwest Asia and particularly the Persian Gulf region. This planning began with a clean slate, to wit, from scratch.

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‍The US officially activated the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) in March 1980 at MacDill AFB, Florida. It was part of the US Readiness Command (REDCOM). The plan was for it to be a highly mobile three-division force. It was deactivated in 1983 and replaced by the US Central Command (USCENTCOM).

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‍Then, in September 1980, Iraq conducted a mechanized invasion of Iran. It’s worth noting that Britain had been the protector of the Persian Gulf, but in 1971 withdrew.

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‍Officially, the US was neutral in the Iraq-Iran War, though it leaned toward favoring Iraq. That war lasted eight years, ending in a stalemate and a UN-brokered peace settlement of sorts.

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‍In a November 21, 1980, memorandum to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, Brzezinski, from Secretary of Defense Harold Brown noted that the US had only a limited military presence in Saudi Arabia, consisting of the AWACS and some access to Oman, and no military presence in Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

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‍During the Iran-Iraq War, each side sank oil tankers and merchant ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Iran declared the Persian Gulf a “free fire zone.” This is understandable since Iran shipped most of its oil through the Persian Gulf, while Iraq exported much of its oil by pipeline.

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‍Iran focused on Kuwaiti-bound ships. Fifty ships were hit in 1985 and 97 in 1986.

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‍Furthermore, on January 12, 1986, the Iranian navy stopped and boarded the US merchant ship President Taylor in the Gulf of Oman, ostensibly searching for weapons that might be intended for Iraq. They held the ship for about two hours. This was the first such incident.

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‍Oil was plentiful during this period, and prices had been falling. But insurance rates skyrocketed, and Kuwait was more vulnerable than the other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members.

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‍In December 1986, Kuwait asked the Soviet Union and the US to protect its shipping in the Persian Gulf. The Soviets promptly responded, and three Soviet tankers were chartered to Kuwait. The Soviets believed that simply flying the Soviet flag would ensure protection. The Soviets seized the opportunity to establish a military presence in the Persian Gulf.

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‍The response from the US was more muddled. As Andrew Marvin wrote,

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‍“In addition to the Soviets’ geopolitical threat, America had a collective psychological fear of oil shortages. (President Reagan) argued, ’t]his could happen again if Iran and the Soviet Union were able to impose their will upon the friendly Arab States of the Persian Gulf, and Iran was allowed to block the free passage of neutral shipping.’”

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‍The US, since 1980, had E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft flying over the western Persian Gulf to protect Saudi Arabia and USN ships occasionally visited Bahrain.

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‍Admiral William Crowe, USN, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), and Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger favored the reflagging. The National Security Council (NSC) also favored the idea. The State Department and Coast Guard hedged on questions of international law and the US War Powers Resolution of 1973.

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‍In response, US President Ronald Reagan authorized eleven Kuwaiti tankers to change their registry to the US under Operation Earnest Will. By then, the US had favored Iraq in its war with Iran, as had most of the GCC members, whose populations were mostly Sunni Muslims, unlike the Shia Iran. GCC members were also wary of the Soviets.

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‍This authorization led to Operation Earnest Will and several other operations to combat Iranian aggression in the Persian Gulf.

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‍In effect, the Persian Gulf became part of the Cold War. The driver was to keep the Soviets out of the Persian Gulf.

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‍That said, Americans also kept the 1973 oil crisis foremost on their minds. Americans remembered not having gasoline available. At the time, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) intended to keep oil away from the US and other countries supporting Israel.

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‍This was a turbulent time in the Persian Gulf and for Presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan. I’ll quickly review what caused the turbulence:

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The Iranian Revolution overthrew the Shah of Iran, Pahlavi, in 1979, whom the US CIA had helped put in power years earlier.
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini took power in February 1979, and Iran became the Islamic Republic of Iran in April 1979.
In November 1979, Iranian students stormed the US Embassy in Tehran and took 66 Americans hostage.
Iraq invaded Iran in September 1980.
President Carter imposed an arms embargo on Iran.
President Reagan became President in January 1981.
The American hostages were released shortly after Reagan took office.
In 1983, the State Department launched a worldwide diplomatic effort to persuade the world not to sell arms to Iran.
The Reagan administration became embroiled in the Iran-Contra Affair between 1985 and 1987, wherein it was selling arms to Iran and using the proceeds to arm the Contra anti-communist militia in Honduras, who were trying to overthrow the government of Nicaragua.
The “Tanker War,” an outgrowth of the Iran-Iraq War, was a series of attacks by Iran and Iraq in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz from 1981 to 1988.

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‍Throughout the operations that followed, US senior policymakers in Washington urged restraint and caution, with no appetite for a large attack against Iran, especially against the Iranian mainland.

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‍Fast forward to the current situation. One lesson from the 1980s that seems applicable today is that the Iranians do not give up easily. They are a stubborn lot. This is especially true when confronted by the US. It was also apparent that the Persian Gulf was a difficult place geographically for USN ships to operate.

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Operation Earnest Will

The Tanker War began in 1981 when Iraq began attacking ships to and from Iran in the Persian Gulf, as well as the oil-loading complex on Kharg Island. Three years later, in 1984, Iran responded by attacking ships linked to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations, most notably Kuwait.

In May 1984, Iranian F-4 fighters attacked the Kuwaiti tanker Umm Casbah with Maverick air-to-ground missiles. This prompted the Americans to strengthen their military presence in the Persian Gulf and upgrade the capabilities of Arab allies in the region.

In September 1986, Iranian Swedish-built Boghammers and Boston Whaler-type craft manned by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) began patrolling the Persian Gulf, attacking ships with 107mm rockets, Rocket-Propelled Grenades (RPGs), and machine guns. They often swarmed their victims.

Zimmerman commented,

“The Pasdaran’s (Iranian Revolutionary Guard) favorite tactic for attacking ships was to swarm around a target and shoot at the vessel’s bridge and superstructure with 107 mm rockets, RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and machine guns. The intent was not so much to sink as to inflict as much damage as possible on the ship and crew.”

In June 1987, the Intelligence Community (IC) issued a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) warning that Iran would challenge Operation Earnest Will and attack Kuwaiti ships, including tankers and escorts. However, a view at high military levels was the oppositie, that Iran would not attack US warships.

While Admiral Crowe did not believe the NIE, he did move additional forces into the region.

On December 6, 1987, Iranian fast boats attacked the Singapore-registered tanker Norman Atlantic in the southern Persian Gulf. The RPGs fired at her struck a compartment filled with naphtha fumes, triggering a large explosion. It sank in the Gulf of Oman, outside the Strait of Hormuz. The 33 crewmen escaped.

On December 9-10, 1987, Iraqi aircraft attacked the Singapore-registered tanker Susangird with French-made Exocet anti-ship missiles while she departed Iran’s Kharg Island. The Susangird was operated by Norwegians and was chartered by the National Iranian Tanker Co. (NITC). The missiles started her on fire, though she was later repaired.

An excellent paper on Operation Earnest Will by Andrew R. Marvin has caused me to spend a few moments on the American military pecking order in the Persian Gulf region during this period.

General George B. Crist, USMC, was in command of the US Central Command (CENTCOM). Rear Admiral Harold Bernsen, USN, commanded the Joint Task Force (JTF) Middle East from 1986 to 1988 and was subordinate to General Crist. Vice Admiral Anthony Less, USN, was given command of JTF Middle East and Operation Earnest Will from 1988 to 1989, still subordinate to General Crist.

In May 1987, an Iraqi Mirage F-1EQ5 fighter attacked the USS Stark (FFG-31) guided missile frigate using two Exocet missiles. Thirty-seven Americans were killed, and 21 were injured. The Stark had been on a routine patrol in the Persian Gulf. Once hit, a fire broke out. The crew brought the fire under control, she did not sink, and she made it back to the US for repairs. Iraq apologized, and the US accepted the apology.

The attack aircraft was Iraqi, but the US blamed Iran.

While the US accepted this apology, it also augmented its naval forces in the Persian Gulf.

In July 1987, Operation Earnest Will began and lasted until September 1988. It was the largest USN convoy operation since WWII, mainly to support Kuwait.

Earnest Will would be the first tactical operation by the US Special Operations Command. Andrew Marvin contends that the “Earnest Will deployment (was) an example of an ad hoc improvisation.”

Harkening back to the Iranian boarding of the US merchant ship President Taylor, the US warned Iran that it would not permit a belligerent power to board US-flagged ships.

The first Earnest Will convoy of two US-flagged Kuwaiti ships left the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for transit to Kuwait on July 22, 1987. The USS Worden (CG-18), USS Fox (CG-33), USS Kidd (DDG-993), USS Crommelin (FFG-37), and USS Klakring (FFG-42) escorted the tanker SS Bridgeton.

A USN ship designated “CG” means it was a guided missile cruiser; DDG was a guided missile destroyer; and FFG translated to guided missile frigate.

Iranian small “fast boats” laid a string of mines west of Farsi Island in the middle of the Persian Gulf. On July 24, 1987, the Bridgeton struck a moored mine while en route to pick up oil from Kuwait. The mine left a gaping hole in the Bridgeton’s hull, but she made it safely to Kuwait.

The Iranians were using Farsi Island as a forward operating base. Rear Admiral Harold Bernsen, USN, at the time commanded Joint Task Force (JTF) Middle East and recommended to General Crist that a mix of helicopters and small boats augmented by Navy SEALs and Marines be used along with naval vessels to deal with the threats.

The suits in Washington were cautious about responding and preferred to show restraint.

That said, preparations were made to do battle with the boats laying such mines. The US sent Special Operations Forces (SOF) and helicopters. The fight was on.

Iran continued laying mines in the Persian Gulf. On August 10, 1987, the US-chartered tanker Texaco Caribbean struck a mine off the coast of Fujairah, UAE, in the Gulf of Oman, outside the Strait of Hormuz.

On October 21, 1987, the USS Hawes (FFG-53), USS William H. Standley (CG-32), and USS Guadalcanal (LPH-7) escorted the Gas King and Gas Princess natural gas carriers in their twelfth Earnest Will convoy. These two ships were again escorted to Kuwait on December 10 in the 20th convoy. A Navy LPH is a Landing Platform Helicopter.

Operation Prime Chance

Operation Prime Chance was closely associated with Operation Earnest Will, was more secretive, and involved the US Special Operations Command (SOCOM). It was the covert component of Operation Earnest Will. It began after an Iranian mine struck the Bridgeton. This was SOCOM's first large-scale combat operation.

The tasks were to protect US-flagged oil tankers from Iranian attack, and detect and neutralize Iranian mine-laying vessels and small boats.

Saudi Arabia and Kuwait would not permit US forces to use their bases against Iran, so planners looked to oil platform construction barges Hercules and Wimbrown VII on which to base helicopters and SEAL-Marine forces. Patrol boats would monitor sea traffic, and helicopters were for fast response.

US Army helicopters from the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) “Night Stalkers” flew night missions from Navy frigates to support naval escort missions. They employed A-6 attack helicopters and M-6 command and control helicopters.

The barges served as mobile sea bases. Each carried a Navy SEAL platoon. Each also had two Mark III fast patrol boats, US Army MH-6 and AH-6 helicopters, an explosive ordnance disposal detachment, and a Marine Corps security detachment.

The barges were controversial because they were vulnerable to air and naval attacks and had no real defense. The counterargument was that there was no serious air or naval threat and that the major threat was unconventional. Admiral William Crowe agreed that the risks were manageable, and the plan went ahead.

David Crist, a historian and former Marine, argued that the barges were defended by a layered defense:

Helicopters out to 50 miles
MK-III patrol boats (fast boats) for mid distances
Seafox coastal patrol boats and PBRs (patrol boat riverine), the first five miles
Marines with machine guns, rifles, and sidearms, and plenty of sandbags located on the barges.

The MK-III boats were outfitted with a stabilized 40mm

bow-mounted Bofers gun, 50 caliber machine guns, and MK–19 grenade launchers, which reduced boat speed but improved firepower. The MK-IIIs were not well-suited for this type of operation, but they were all that was available.

In September 1987, US naval intelligence in Bahrain was alerted to an Iranian LST landing craft, the Iran Ajr, suspicious that it was laying mines in the area of Bahrain. The USS Jarrett (FFG-33) was notified to investigate. Two US Army helicopters from the Jarrett flew to the target area and found the Iran Ajr laying mines.

The helicopters fired rockets and machine guns, damaging the ship, killing some crew, and forcing others to jump overboard. The helicopters left to reload and refuel and returned to the Jarrett only to find the Iranian LST still laying mines. A SEAL team was dispatched and took control of the Iranian ship. The US rescued 26 Iranians and returned them to Iran by way of the UAE.

The USN took the Iranian Ajr to Iranian waters, and the SEALs scuttled the ship. They also captured valuable Iranian planning documents.

On October 8, 1987, the Hercules barge commander sent three patrol boats to the Middle Shoals Buoy about 15 miles west of Farsi Island with Marine linguists to listen to Iranian communications. An SH-2F LAMPS helicopter from the USS Thach was aloft to scout potential Iranian fast boats.

The HSL LAMPS was an SH-2F Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System helicopter anti-submarine anti-ship surveillance unit, in this case, a detachment, one or two helicopters.

The SH-2F spotted an Iranian Boghammer and two smaller vessels already at the buoy. The Iranians opened with machine-gun fire, and the SH-2F brought in two A-6 attack helicopters. The A-6s attacked the two smaller boats, which set them on fire. The Boghammer fired an anti-aircraft missile, which did not explode, and an A-6 hit the Boghammer with a missile and sank her. The US crews picked up the surviving Iranians.

The task force adjusted its operations and employment plans. The Wimbrown VII barge became operational in December 1987. The Iranians played around but did not risk engagement following the fight at the Middle Shoals Buoy.

Also on October 9, 1987 Army helicopters from the USS Klakring (FFG-42) spotted three Iranian fast boats near Farsi Island. One of the Iranian boats fired a shoulder-mounted surface-to-air missile at the helicopters but missed. The helicopters responded and sank one Iranian boat and damaged two more, one of which later sank.

Back in February 1986, the Iranians captured Iraq’s al-Faw Peninsula and Chinese-made Silkworm anti-ship cruise missiles. The Silkworm presented a new challenge as they are land-based and mobile. Additionally, they weigh about 1500 lbs and carry a high-explosive warhead with an extensive range out to about 180 miles.

The US warned Iran against using the missile. The US also warned Iran against using mines in international waters or the waters of neutral states. However, the experts knew that Iran would not be easily intimidated. Nonetheless, US planning ensued to use Tomahawk cruise missiles against Silkworm sites.

On October 15, 1987, the Iranians fired a Silkworm missile at the Sungai, a US-owned, Liberian-registered ship, and hit her on the side.

On October 16, the Iranians fired a Silkworm and struck a reflagged Kuwaiti tanker, Sea Isle City, anchored off Iraq’s Mina al-Ahmadi terminal. The missile wounded 18 crew members. This was the first attack on any of the 11 Kuwaiti tankers protected by the USN.

Operation Nimble Archer

As a result, the USS Thach (FFG-43) warned Iranians on the Rashadat oil platform to get off the platform. The USS Hoel (DDG-13), USS Leftwich (DD-984), and USS John Young (DD-973) opened fire and set the platform ablaze. Furthermore, Navy SEALs boarded the platform, set demolition charges, and captured important documents. These US operations were part of Operation Nimble Archer.

By March 1988, the struggle between Iraq and Iran got nasty. The Iraqis attacked Iran’s Kharg Island and sank two Iranian tankers, but in the process, Iranian F-14 fighters shot down two Tu-22 Blinder bombers and one MiG-25RB Foxbat reconnaissance aircraft.

USN ships then began operating close to neutral ships to provide protection. The USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) harassed an Iranian frigate, Sabalan, and the two danced around the Persian Gulf after each other, which protected neutral ships.

Thus far, the US had implemented Operation Earnest Will, it captured the Iran Ajr, It had implemented Operations Prime Chance and Nimble Archer, and naval rules of engagement (ROE) had been liberalized. Then, on April 14, 1988, the USS Roberts (FFG-58) struck a mine that was laid down across her track following a successful escort.

The Roberts’ keel was busted, the ship quickly flooded, and a fire broke out. She briefly lost power because three of the four diesel generators were out of action. The Iranians frigate Sabalan approached the area.

The Roberts skipper, who saw signs of his ship sinking by the stern, ordered a live round to be loaded into the missile launcher. The Sabalan noted this action and kept her distance.

The Roberts crew put out the fires, and she was towed to the UAE, after which she was loaded onto a semi-submersible, heavy lift ship named the Mighty Servant 2 and taken to the US for repairs. Some of the Roberts crew were taken back to the US with burns and other injuries.

The suits in Washington did not want to escalate to the point of all-out war, so they sought “proportional responses.” Instructions were issued: Do not to attack the Iranian mainland without Washington's approval.

However, General Crist, Admiral Crowe, and Vice Admiral Anthony Less, now the commander of JTF Middle East, pushed for increased retaliation. For example, Admiral Less wanted to attack Iran’s naval headquarters at Bandar Abbas and mine the port. This was not approved.

Operation Praying Mantis

As a result, Operation Praying Mantis began on April 18, 1988, said to be the largest USN surface action since WWII, as you will see.

The USN retaliated for the mine strike on the USS Roberts and targeted the Iranian frigate Sabalan. Historian Harold Wise commented that the Sabalan had gained a “notorious reputation” and sailors referred to its skipper as “Captain Nasty.” Wise said,

“One Iranian ship . . . named Sabalan, gained a notorious reputation for these activities. The captain of Sabalan, known as Captain Nasty to Americans, would board tankers bound for Kuwait, Iraq, or Saudi Arabia, and pretend to carry out a friendly inspection . . . then, once the charade was over, Captain Nasty would order an attack on his defenseless prey.”

A gaggle of ships and warfighters supported the Roberts. Surface Action Group (SAG) Bravo consisted of the USS Merrill (DD-976) with an HSL-35 LAMPS helo detachment embarked, the USS Lynde McCormick (DDG-8), and USS Trenton (LPD-14) with a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) embarked, along with the LAMPS detachment off the damaged Samuel B. Roberts.

The DDs are destroyers, and the LPD is a Landing Platform Dock used for amphibious warfare.

It’s still April 18, and SAG Bravo approached the Iranian Sassan oil platform and warned all hands there to get off. Following this, the ships opened fire. There was an Iranian ZU-23 anti-aircraft gun on the platform. It returned fire, and the Iranians asked for a ceasefire. Some of those on the platform abandoned it and boarded a tug, but some remained and continued firing. A Marine AH-1 Cobra helicopter gunship shut that down. Marines then boarded the platform.

Following this, SAG Bravo was instructed to head over to the Rakhsh oil platform and destroy it. Two Iranian F-4 fighters began their attack run on the SAG, but the USS Lynde McCormick's missile fire control radar locked on to them, and they broke off their attack run.

SAG Charlie headed over to Iran’s Sirri Oil Platform, put out the warning, and then attacked, employing the USS Wainwright (CG-28), USS Simpson (FFG-56), and USS Bagley (FF-1069). The CG is a guided missile cruiser, while the FFs are light frigates. The naval fire struck a compressed gas tank, which exploded. That was the end of this oil platform.

The Iranians sent out Boghammer fast boats to attack tankers in the southern Persian Gulf, causing some damage. USN A-6 Intruder fighters launched from the USS Enterprise aircraft carrier and sank one of the fast boats, causing the others to high-tail it out of there.

Continuing on April 18, the Iranian navy sent the Joshan missile patrol boat to the scene of action, and she closed on the USS Wainwright. The Wainwright warned Joshan to stay away; she did not and instead fired a Harpoon all-weather, over-the-horizon, anti-ship missile at the Wainwright.

In response, the USS Simpson fired four surface-to-surface missiles, the Wainwright and USS Bagley each fired one, all at the Joshan. Four missiles struck Joshan, but she did not sink. Not satisfied, the US ships then sank the Joshan, killing 15 sailors.

While this action was underway, two Iranian F4 fighters orbited overhead, and the Wainwright engaged them with surface-to-air missiles, striking one, and causing the other to beat feet.

April 18, 1988, was a hell-uva-day. Samuel Cox of the Naval History and Heritage Command wrote, “Iran experienced a really bad day on 18 April 1988.”

Naval A-6s engaged the Iranian frigate Sahand and sank her. The Iranian Sabalan fired a SA-7 hand-held surface-to-air missile at an A-6, which in turn placed a 500 lb. laser-guided bomb down Sabalan’s smokestack, leaving her dead in the water (DIW).

Regrettably, a USMC AH-1T Sea Cobra helicopter gunship crashed at night about 15 miles from Abu Musa Island. Both crew members were lost: Captain Stephen C. Leslie and Capt. Kenneth W. Hill. Navy divers recovered their bodies in May. Their aircraft was also recovered and showed no signs of battle damage. The consensus seems to be that it was very dark, they had had a long day in the fight, and were trying to evade Iranian fire.

The Iranians were not finished. On July 12, 1988, Iranian small boats attacked the Universal Monarch in international waters but then retreated to the Iranian exclusion zone, hoping to avoid counter-attack. However, both Hercules and Wimbrown VII launched OH-58 helicopters authorized to attack the boats in the exclusion zone near Farsi. One OH-58 received hostile fire and struck the boat with a high-explosive rocket. That was the end of that.

Iran Air Flight 655

On July 3, 1988, the USS Vincennes (CG-49) and the USS Sides (FFG-14) were on patrol in the Persian Gulf. The Vincennes spotted an aircraft on radar and designated it as an Iranian F-14 fighter. Both the Vincennes and Sides sent out warning messages, which were not heeded. The Vincennes fired a surface-to-air missile, which struck the aircraft, which was in reality an Iranian Airbus Flight 655, causing it to crash, killing all 290 civilian passengers.