Svalbard Intro

‍The Svalbard-Bear Island Gap

‍Greenland aside, Svalbard is a “Wild Card”

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‍Introduction

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‍There was a time when the Arctic was seen as an “international zone of peace.” No more. It is increasingly viewed as a region of great power rivalry.

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‍Most are aware that President Trump wanted to take control of Greenland. He has not been subtle or even diplomatic. His rhetoric implies a yearning for full control over the defense of North America. His remarks about annexing Canada are driven by much the same impulse.

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‍President Trump’s idea of buying Greenland is not new.

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‍During or shortly after WWII, the JCS recommended that the US purchase Greenland from Denmark. The Secretary of State, James Byrnes, discussed the proposal with Danish Foreign Minister Gustav Rasmussen in December 1946, and Rasmussen responded that he would give the idea “careful study.”

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‍In January 1955, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) recommended to the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) that the US acquire title to Greenland. The State Department disagreed, and the suggestion was filed in the “too hard to handle” box during the Eisenhower Administration.

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‍Legitimate American national security needs lie beneath President Trump’s rhetoric. Underlying those needs are important organizational demands and technological developments that the president did not address in his discussion of Greenland.

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‍Denmark and the US are negotiating over the US establishing more bases in Greenland. The scuttlebutt is that the US wants three, mainly in the south. The negotiations are being held in secret, so I do not know what the US has in mind. But I do have an idea.

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‍The consensus is that the US is seeking air bases with runways and support infrastructure, and perhaps usable port facilities. I have heard of two possibilities and perhaps a third,

Qaqortoq Airport serves the largest town in southern Greenland. Located in the far south, the airport could be shared with the US military, as it is in so many places abroad, as part of its “lily pad” strategy. However, Qaqortoq’s port has minimal facilities and can handle only small patrol boats. Narsarsuaq, 10 miles to the north, was used by the US during WWII and known as “Bluie West-One” (BW-1). It could serve as a heliport for ice-observation flights, or the US might prefer it to Qaqortoq. It once hosted a 1,000-bed hospital.
Kangerlussuaq, known as Sondrestrom during WWII, is a good candidate, though it is above the Arctic Circle. It has a road to a port for support and was used by various USAF commands into the 1980s. It is on the west coast, across the Davis Strait and the Canada-US Northwest Passage.
Ilulissat, by Greenland standards, is a large town. It is on the west coast, has an airport about two miles northeast of the town, has a port, and is on the Davis Strait. It was not used by the US during or after WWII.

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‍I have pondered why the US might want such bases. They could serve as aircraft staging bases to deter Russian bombers and monitor the sea lines of communication (SLOC). The US Navy (USN) wants to deploy its ships, including aircraft carriers, into the Arctic, so a port and suitable runway over there could be useful.

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‍The US already operates the Pittufik Space Force Base far to the north. Its Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWRs) can detect Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) launches and prompt missile interceptors elsewhere to destroy the ICBMs. It has a runway and support facilities and has hosted US fighter deployments during exercises. Pittufik can also detect aircraft, but not at low altitudes.

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‍General Gregory Guillot, USAF, the US commander of Northern Command (NORTHCOM), has advocated an increased military presence in Greenland to provide decision-makers with more options for a strategy to deter and deny Russian and Chinese approaches to North America.

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‍Nevada Joan Lee of the European Council on Foreign Relations has raised an interesting notion, suggesting that Norway’s Svalbard Archipelago might well emerge as a “wild card” in the effort to deny and deter aggression from the Barents Sea through the Norwegian Sea and into the North Atlantic Ocean.

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‍Lee presents two scenarios the US could pursue to gain greater influence, if not control, over this archipelago. Her work aligns with a statement made by Elizabeth Buchanan, a “Canadian-borne Australian” geopolitical research professional,

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‍“Competitors are jostling for Arctic domination.”

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‍“Arctic domination?”

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‍Russia

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‍The Arctic is a relatively new frontier. In my view, Russia has an advantage because it has opened the Northern Sea Route (NSR), the shortest maritime route between Europe and the Pacific. The NSR extends about 3,000 miles along the breadth of Russia’s northern coast.

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‍The Russians have worked hard and invested boatloads of money to bring the NSR to market. China, France, and Japan have invested as well. Russia and its energy companies are developing major natural gas fields in the region.

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‍The Northern Sea Route (NSR) has driven Russia’s Arctic Policy 2035.

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‍The Center for Global Europe has said,

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‍“The stage is set for geopolitical challenges to emerge in the high north (because of the) new abundance ofoil, gas, and rare earth metals and critical raw materials.”

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‍Russia’s plan is to use Arctic-qualified ships to pick up these energy products and deliver them to ports in Asia and Europe via the NSR. China is using the NSR to send oil and gas tankers to fill up and transit to global markets. China also sends its container ships carrying its products to European and American markets.

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‍The NSR includes several seaports on the NSR including Sabetta, Dickson, Dudinka, Khatanga, Tiksi, Pevek, and Cape Dezhnev.

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‍Russia covets the NSR and aims to tightly control maritime traffic along it. There is no Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOP) along the NSR.

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‍Rosatom, Russia’s state-owned national nuclear corporation, is the sole operator of the NSR infrastructure. It is a powerful state company, well-managed and disposed to serve as a geopolitical tool.

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‍Through its subsidiary, Atomflot/Rosatomflot, it operates the world’s only nuclear-powered icebreakers, which keep the NSR open and increase its traffic throughput.

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‍The Russian Nagurskoye air base guards the entrance to the Barents Sea. It has received significant investment and is said to be operational year-round and capable of handling any aircraft. It hosts the Bastion missile defense system, which can engage surface ships, including carrier battle groups, using its P-800 Oniks supersonic anti-ship missile.

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‍The Russian Northern Fleet is headquartered in Severomorsk on the Kola Peninsula, with naval bases throughout the peninsula. It is subordinate to the Russian Navy, not to the five military districts. This fleet is a critical strategic asset for Russia. A wide array of Russian naval ships is based here, with the most lethal being Strategic Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs). These multirole submarines frequently sail into the Atlantic.

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‍Russia most certainly intends to establish hegemony over its Arctic holdings and to have its Navy patrol the North Atlantic at will.

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‍Russia reorganized its military districts to better prepare for the Arctic and for NATO on European soil. This move followed Sweden and Finland's NATO membership. Russia now shares an 830-mile border with a NATO member, Finland. This development prompted Russia to rethink its defense strategy.

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‍Russia eliminated the Western Military District (WMD). It covered much of western Russia facing NATO. The leadership felt it was too large and unwieldy.

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‍The Russians eliminated the WMD and assigned its responsibilities to two military districts, the Moscow and the Leningrad Military Districts, and took a curious action regarding the Northern Fleet,

Leningrad Military District (LMD): Headquartered in St. Petersburg on the Baltic Sea in northwestern Russia, the LMD’s Area of Responsibility (AOR) includes the border regions of Finland, Norway, and Sweden. The Northern Fleet’s air and ground resources were assigned to the LMD.
Moscow Military District (MMD): Headquartered in Moscow, its AOR includes central and western Russia, as well as border areas with Ukraine, Belarus, and Poland.
The Russian Northern Fleet, headquartered on the Kola Peninsula, became independent of any military district. Its land and air resources were assigned to the LMD, but its surface and subsurface forces remained under the command of the Northern Fleet and were subordinate to the commander of the Russian Navy.

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‍All military responsibility for Russia's Arctic territories was consolidated under the LMD to secure all Russian interests and project power in the region.

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‍President Putin noted in April 2026, according to Pravda, that Russia was “strengthening the Arctic logistics framework, including sea and river ports, railways and highways, and airports.” He commented, “Geopolitical competition and the struggle for positions around the Arctic zone itself are intensifying.”

Table of Contents

Introduction

Arctic Domination?

Russia

China

US Defense Policy

NATO organizational reshuffle

Sea Lines of Communication: High North

Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap

Svalbard and the Bear Island Gap

A note on the Gray Zones

China

Liselotte Odgaard of the Hudson Institute has written,

“The Arctic region is not high on China’s strategic agenda … (but) for the past two decades, China has worked hard to establish an Arctic profile as a benevolent power.”

China is not an Arctic state. It aims to change that and is off to the races, seeing itself as a “near Arctic state,” even though it is nearly 1000 miles away. It also hopes to become a “polar great power” by 2035. It views the Arctic as a “new security domain.”

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, in a May 2019 speech in Finland, opined that,

“There are only Arctic States and Non-Arctic States. No third category exists, and claiming otherwise entitles China to exactly nothing.”

That was in 2019. The times have changed.

At present, China is piggybacking on Russia in the Arctic region, though it does provide a significant amount of financial and technological support to bolster Russia’s military posture in the Arctic.

China has begun using Russia’s NSR for shipping and is poised to expand its use. It could use the NSR for its navy, but would need to pass through the Bering Strait near Alaska. The Chinese navy and air force use Russian bases and ports and conduct joint military maneuvers. For example, the two share a base in the Sea of Okhotsk, below the Bering Sea.

In the near term, China prefers that Russia project power from the Barents Sea. China is also cautious in its overall approach to the Arctic, as one author suggests, “China’s Arctic ambiguity.” However, Anne-Marie Brady, an expert on China and polar politics from New Zealand, has written,

“From a nuclear security point of view, the Arctic is China’s vulnerable northern flank … Chinese submarine-based ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) operating in the Arctic could restore China’s nuclear deterrence capability.”

China has much to learn about the Arctic. It has sent its Jialong-crewed submersible vehicle deep beneath Arctic ice and dispatched its icebreakers to the Arctic, both to collect data and to experience the environment. It must map the ocean floor so its nuclear submarines can deploy to the Arctic.

China established its first Arctic research station in 2004 at Ny-Ålesund, Svalbard, about 70 miles northwest of Barentsburg as the crow flies. It appears to be co-located with the United Kingdom’s research station. The Chinese call it the Yellow River Station.

China activated its Remote Sensing Satellite North Polar Ground Station in Kiruna, Sweden, in 2016 and the China-Iceland Arctic Science Observatory in Iceland in 2018.

US Defense Arctic Policy

The US Department of Defense (DoD) approach in the Arctic is “monitor and respond,” meaning it invests in sensors, intelligence, and information-sharing capabilities.

On the surface, this is a defensive strategy in which the US and its allies seek to deny Russia freedom of action in the North Atlantic. I doubt that the DoD intends to interfere with the NSR.

The DoD includes Greenland in the North American Arctic Region, along with Alaska and Canada. This places Greenland within the US Northern Command (NORTHCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR).

The DoD defines the European Arctic region to include Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, all NATO allies, as well as Russia’s Kola Peninsula. This places the region within the US European Command (EUCOM) and NATO AOR.

This division of effort is a possible organizational shortfall.

NATO organizational reshuffle

NATO has attempted to address this problem and has reshuffled its organizations to address the Atlantic divide between NORTHCOM and EUCOM. NATO added an entity to the Joint Forces Command (JFC), which now consists of a trio of operational commands.

JFC Brunssum, Netherlands oriented to the eastern flank
JFC Naples, Italy focused on the southern flank
JFC Norfolk, Virginia, US, is the new JFC and specializes in the Atlantic and the “Arctic Bridge,” the operational corridor between North America and Europe, as well as the maritime chokepoints of the High North.

JFC Norfolk was established in 2019. In addition to the Atlantic and Arctic, its AOR includes Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Great Britain was expected to command JFC Norfolk, meaning all three NATO Joint Force Commands would be led by a European officer. However, a USN admiral is now the commander, and his deputy is a Royal Navy admiral. It appears the transfer of command to a British naval officer will occur when the current US commander rotates out.

NATO opened a third Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in Bodø, northern Norway, to improve air surveillance and awareness in the Arctic/High North.

NATO says it has improved coordination with NORAD, NORTHCOM, and EUCOM.

Furthermore, the emergence of the P-8 Poseidon ASW international fleet has had an impact. There are now P-8 subcenters at,

RAF Lossiemouth, Scotland
Evenes Air Station, Norway
Nordholz Naval Air Base, Germany
US Naval Station Jacksonville, Florida and NAS Whidbey Island, Washington
Forward Operating Locations at
Kevlavik Air Base, Iceland
Oslo-Gardermoen Air Station, Norway
Naval Air Station Sigonella, Sicily, Italy
Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, Japan

These revisions and updates seem headed in the right direction, but many of the actions taken will take time to take root, be evaluated, and be tweaked.

JFC Norfolk strikes me as largely a naval outfit with a naval mission directed at the critical sea lines of communication to the Atlantic Ocean, though its mission statement says it is more than that.

Go to: Sea Lines of Communication: High North