Soviet Foxtrots: Cuban Missile Crisis
Loaded with nuke-tipped torpedos
Rules of Engagement
A considerable amount of information has been released by Russia since 1962. As a result, we gain a good inside look at the Rules of Engagement (ROE) that the submarine commanders were to follow, as directed by their leadership. As you will see, the ROE were conflicting and messy at best. I have concluded the decision to fire the nuclear-tipped torpedos was in the hands of the submarine captains.
I will summarize each set of instructions and follow that with the documented supporting text.
Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union Sergei Gorshkov summoned Rear Admiral Rybalko (shown to the right) before the captains went to their boats. Gorshkov instructed Rybalko as follows:
- Do not allow antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces to detect you during your transit to Mariel, Cuba.
- Surveil the waters around Mariel to make sure there are no ASW forces there.
- Admiral Rybalko, I am now bringing to your attention that the submarines are carrying special weapons.
- The submarine commanders will have advanced authorization to use them without higher approval if attacked.
- The submarine commanders will use their special weapons if attacked or forced to surface and attacked, or if they receive orders from Moscow.
TEXT
"You are in no way to allow American antisubmarine forces to discover your submarines during the transit. Your assignment is to get to Mariel undetected by October 20 (1962) and to prepare for the subsequent deployment of seven ballistic missile submarines, which will follow with their support ships. You are to reconnoiter the waters surrounding Mariel and ensure they are free of American antisubmarine forces, fixed acoustic arrays, and to survey and report hydroacoustic conditions of the area … What you don't know, Admiral Rybalko, is that the new elements … are the special torpedo warheads your submarines will carry … Your brigade commander and submarine commanding officers will have advance authorization to engage the special weapons without permission from fleet headquarters or the ministry in Moscow if attacked by American ships or aircraft … our rules of engagement are quite clear. You will use your weapons if American forces attack you submerged or force your units to surface and then attack, or upon receipt of orders from Moscow … Those rules have been approved by the Politburo, and the first secretary, and that is enough for us. We will follow orders."
Rybalko was stunned by Gorshkov's instructions. According to these instructions, submarine commanders had the authority to fire at will, acting on their own initiative. That could have resulted in a nuclear war.
However, some days later, while gathered together before leaving port, Admiral Rybalko told his captains,
- Use discretion when employing these very lethal weapons
- Try to keep us out of the next world war
TEXT
"You each possess the capability of inflicting lethal damage to American forces, but I urge you to use discretion. It is considered highly unlikely that American ASW forces will be any more than at their usual state of alert, which isn't much of a threat. Study your mission closely, they are outlined in great detail … Each of you has in your hands the potential to start the next world war, and so, Comrades, do try to keep us out of war. Now, good sailing, and keep seven feet beneath the keel."
Captain Ketov was unsure about the orders and asked,
"Comrade Admiral, I know our orders are detailed in the sealed packets already aboard, but we're all concerned about the rules governing the use of the special torpedoes. What exactly are we to expect? How and when may we use them?"
Admiral Vitaly Fokin, at the time first deputy to Admiral Gorshkov, stepped in and said:
"Comrade Commanders, we are still not fully prepared to address that issue, but to be sure …"
And then Vice Admiral Anatoly Rossokho, chief of staff and deputy commander of the Soviet Northern Fleet, came forth suddenly and told the four captains this,
- Use the weapons if attacked and hit, or
- If Moscow orders their use
TEXT
"Comrade Commanders, enter these words in your logs when you return aboard: Use of the special weapons is authorized under the following conditions: first, in the event you are attacked with depth bombs and your pressure hull is ruptured; second if you surface and are taken under fire and hit; and third upon orders from Moscow."
Captain Ketov remembered more specific instructions, according to Svetlana V. Savranskaya, in her paper "New Sources on the Role of Soviet Submarines in the Cuban Missile Crisis. She quoted Captain Ketov saying:
"The only person who talked to us about those weapons was Vice-Admiral Rossokho. 'Write down when you should use these … In three cases. First, if you get a hole under the water. A hole in your hull. This is the first case. Second, a hole above the water. If you have to come to the surface, and they shoot at you, and you get a hole in your hull. And the third case – when Moscow orders you to use these weapons’. These were our instructions … 'I suggest to you, commanders, that you use the nuclear weapons first, and then you will figure out what to do after that.' "
To complicate all this, Huchthausen said, once the secret orders were opened, they read in part as follows:
"Torpedoes with atomic weapons may be used only as directed in instructions from the Ministry of Defense (MoD) or the Main Navy Staff."
So these captains had been given a variety of rules of engagement. I do not think this has been resolved to date. Captain Shumkov would later order the nuclear torpedo's tube to be flooded. He did not intend to use it. Ketov remarked he hoped he would not have to use it.
Admiral Rybalko understood these instructions were a mess. He knew there were problems uploading the torpedoes, and he was aware that the captains had never fired them. He also knew that his captains had not previously worked with atomic weapons. And, he was uneasy about the variety of orders given to his captains.
Huchthausen commented,
"Captain Dubivko, B-36 skipper, watched the loading of the torpedoes in Sayda. A staff officer was helping, which he thought odd. That officer told Dubivko the torpedo that was being loaded had a 15 kiloton nuclear warhead, enough to destroy a US carrier group. The staff officer told him that he intended to load the torpedo into tube number 2 once they passed the Iceland-Faroe-Shetland UK gap, shown in the map, at which point they would enter waters heavily patrolled by US aircraft. The staff officer was not submarine trained and expected to get on-the-job training while in transit.”
