‍Recon Team Breaker, Hill Battles of Vietnam

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‍“Scarface, this is Breaker. We're burning. You gotta get us out!”

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‍Brief history of the march up to Breaker Patrol

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‍Sgt. James Neil Tycz's letter to "Mom and Pop" was an exceedingly noble one,

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‍"None of us want to go, but that’s our job and I pray I will never fail to do it. Your Marine Son, Neil.” 

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‍“I pray I will never fail to do it." 

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‍Those are powerful words. Strong enough to make someone reflect on these men and on Hill 665, RVN. What is Hill 665? Where is it located? Why was Breaker Patrol there?

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‍To craft meaningful responses to questions like this, I reconstructed the history that led these brave six Marines and one Navy medic to Hill 665, northwest of Khe Sanh, RVN, on May 9-10, 1967.

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‍There is a vast amount of excellent information available for reconstructing this history, so much that I hesitate to present it here, worried that I have little to add. Still, I feel driven by the heroism and courage of our Vietnam veterans to make the attempt.

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‍Breaker Patrol fought in what are known as "The Hill Battles" of Khe Sanh that preceded the more well-known and widely discussed 77-day siege of that Marine combat base.

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‍The problem confronting US military members at Khe Sanh was that the enemy occupied the hills around the base and the base was on a plateau below these hills. It is curious that the UDS would select this location, mindful of the French disaster at Dien Bien Phu. That French suite of bases was located in a basin about 12 miles ling and four miles wide, surrounded by mountains.

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‍Edward F. Murphy wrote the book, The Hill Fights, about the first battle of Khe Sanh. The cover description alone makes it worth exploring the history leading up to Breaker Patrol,

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‍"While the seventy-seven day siege of Khe Sanh in early 1968 remains one of the most highly publicized clashes of the Vietnam War, scant attention has been paid to the first battle of Khe Sanh, also known as 'the Hill Fights.' Although this harrowing combat in the spring of 1967 provided a grisly preview of the carnage to come at Khe Sanh, few are aware of the significance of the battles, or even their existence. For more than 30 years, virtually the only people who knew about the Hill Fights were the Marines who fought them." 

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‍I began this story by asking, what brought these brave six Marines and one Navy medic to these battles, along with all those others who did the same?

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‍The Marines arrived in the RVN between March 8 and 10, 1965, and used the air base at Da Nang. General William Westmoreland, USA, Commander Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), asked for two battalions of Marines to protect the airfield. These Marines were the first official U.S. ground combat forces in Vietnam.

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‍Marine Observation Squadron 2 (VMO-2) deployed two squadrons of UH-1E Iroquois helicopters, the “Huey,” to Da Nang as well. The total number of Marines at Da Nang was about 5,000.

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‍Initially, the Marines were not supposed to participate in day-to-day operations. They were in Da Nang for base defense. However, they did transport the Army of Vietnam (ARVN) troops to landing zones outside Da Nang. By April 1965, the Marines were authorized to locate and engage communist Viet Cong forces in their area of responsibility. 

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‍Editorial note: I see this as a major faux pas committed by the President and US military leadership. First, send fighter aircraft to an airbase, in this case, Da Nang. Next, send a small number of Marines to protect the airbase. Next, provide them with helicopters and use them to ferry ARVN troops to and from battle. Then, send in more Marines to locate and engage the enemy. Build more air bases, and the cycle continues until you find yourself in a major war.

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‍By June 1965, the Marines had seven battalions in the northern Quang Tri Province and were in charge of a variety of Army units. They had bases at Phu Bai, 30 miles north of Da Nang, and Chu Lai, 57 miles south.

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‍The Marines were part of the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) of the 3rd Marine Division (MARDIV). It was redesignated as the III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), commanded by Lt. General Louis Walt. Walt was subordinate to Westmoreland. The Army was responsible for the ground war across RVN except for I Corps, the northernmost region. That was Marine Country.

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‍By the end of 1965, the Marines had taken control of all ground operations in I Corps. Their missions included defending and securing their bases, conducting search and destroy missions against the Viet Cong (VC) in their area and against distant enemy bases, carrying out clearing operations in adjacent areas, and executing any contingency plans assigned by MACV. This was a significant shift from just defending the base at Danang.

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‍Khe Sanh’s importance grew because it was on Route 9, close to Laos, where the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) was powerful. It was vital for defending the western side of the DMZ. American intelligence units could use it as a staging area for missions inside Laos and upcoming ground operations there, especially targeting the Ho Chi Minh Trail. It ran east-to-west, close to the DMZ, with its eastern terminus intersecting the north-south Route 1.

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‍Lt. General Nguyen Chanh Thi, the ARVN commander of I Corps, a devout Buddhist, and regarded by General Walt as an exceptional military leader who commanded great respect among ARVN soldiers, was viewed in Saigon and by some in Washington as being too soft on communism. Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky dismissed General Thi. This decision led the predominantly Buddhist population of Quang Tri Province to rebel in what became known as the Buddhist Crisis of 1966. The rebellion started in Da Nang, placing the Marines in a difficult position.

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‍The NVA leadership saw this revolt as an opportunity. The NVA aimed to capture the two northern provinces of RVN. It sent more infiltrators into RVN to fuel the Buddhist uprising. As a result, General Walt deployed many reconnaissance patrols into the DMZ area.

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‍In July 1966, the NVA invaded Quang Tri from the north and west with large numbers of regular forces, estimated at 10,000 to 12,000 troops. The Marines and ARVN launched Operation Hastings and pushed back the NVA.

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‍It is noteworthy that the NVA chose to move through the more mountainous and rugged terrain in the western part of the province. This indicates a growing pattern of shifting the battle zone further west. Nevertheless, the NVA also launched attacks across the entire breadth of the DMZ. 

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‍The NVA's planned invasion of Quang Tri did not work, but that attempt was only the beginning of fighting in the DMZ.

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‍In August 1966, the NVA returned to Quang Tri and entrenched themselves throughout the western sectors, near Khe Sanh. The Marines were outnumbered. True to Marine tradition, the Marines moved closer to the DMZ.

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‍In September 1966, General Walt sent the first group of Marines into the Special Forces camp at Khe Sanh. 

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‍Small Marine units had been at Khe Sanh since April 1964, including the Marine 1st Radio Company collecting signals intelligence against enemy forces in Laos and both Vietnams, a small infantry company for force protection, and an 81 mm mortar section. But now, a full battalion was moving in, and Khe Sanh and the III MAF would never be the same.

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‍The combat base itself sat on a plateau above the Rao Quan River but was surrounded by hilltop peaks and the Khe Sanh Gap-Route 9. 

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‍Lieutenant General Willard Pearson, in his superb study presented by the Department of the Army in 1975 entitled “The War in the Northern Provinces, 1966-1968," described the terrain this way:

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‍"The rugged mountainous countryside provided a natural infiltration route. Most of the mountain trails were hidden by three canopies of jungle up to 60 feet high, dense elephant grass, and bamboo thickets. Concealment from reconnaissance aircraft was good, and the heavy jungle undergrowth limited ground observation to five meters in most places. The most conspicuous terrain feature is Dong Tri Mountain, at 1,015 meters (Hill 1015) the highest peak in the region. Four smaller hills, Hill 881 North, Hill 861, Hill 558, and Hill 881 South, dominated the main avenues of approach to the base. It was on and around these smaller hills that most of the significant battles were fought during the first phase of what was to become the long and stubborn struggle for Khe Sanh.”

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‍There were three routes to Khe Sanh: the D'Ai Lao or Khe Sanh Gap along Route 9 to Laos; another approach led to the base along the streams of the Rao Quan River from the north-northwest; and the third came from the northwest across a ridge that crosses the Laotian border, merging with Hills 881N, 881S, and 861, all marked on the map.

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‍General Walt knew he had his hands full. In the summer of 1966, it was estimated that the enemy had 23 main force battalions in Quang Tri; by the end of the year, that number had risen to 52.

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‍The period from January to May 1967 was very significant. The level of combat operations increased sharply inside the DMZ during the early part of 1967.

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‍Two full North Vietnamese divisions, the 325th and 304th, operating from the DMZ, launched heavy bombardments on US Marine bases south of the DMZ, including Khe Sanh, the Rockpile, Cam Lo, Dong Ha, Con Thien, and Gio Linh. A third NVA division was moved to Route 9 east of Khe Sanh to cut off land reinforcements and resupply from the east.

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‍While it seems almost unbelievable, the suits back in Washington decided it was a good idea to build an unmanned barrier across the DMZ, called the strong point obstacle system (SPOS). This idea was hatched by some professors at Harvard and sold to Secretary of Defense McNamara in 1966. Its unclassified nickname was “Practice Nine,” later called “Dye Marker,” but it came to be known as the "McNamara Line."

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‍General Westmoreland was not fond of the Harvard-McNamara idea, but, despite objections from his other commanders, agreed with it because it aligned with his plan to build a manned and fortified obstacle barrier.

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‍General Walt opposed the idea. He believed he needed reinforcements to prevent a potential North Vietnamese annexation of South Vietnam’s two northern provinces. Walt did not want to use valuable Marines to build an obstacle system. Walt lost this argument.

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‍On March 26, 1967, the construction and occupation of the SPOS south of the DMZ began. In April 1967, the Marines of the 3rd Division started building the barrier, focusing mostly on clearing and preliminary construction. Serious work did not actually start until later in the year and would end soon afterward.

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‍In late February 1967, General Westmoreland authorized III MAF to fire artillery at military targets inside and north of the DMZ. The enemy responded with artillery barrages against allied fire bases at Gio Linh, Con Thien, and Camp Carroll.

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‍Westmoreland also decided to reinforce the southern I Corps with large Army units to free the Marines to move more forces north. Army Task Force (TF) Oregon was organized as a multi-brigade force.

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‍This was the first large Army deployment into I Corps. TF Oregon was under the operational control of III MAF, making III MAF technically a joint command. However, it had a great deal of operational independence, and this became increasingly true over time.

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‍Marine units continued assembling from across Quang Tri province and beyond to hold the area near the DMZ. As they did this, they established bases and logistics facilities in the DMZ zone, the largest at Dong Ha on the eastern end of Route 9, where it intersects the north-south Route 1. Another was set up at Camp Carroll, eight miles southwest of Dong Ha, a large artillery base, and at a smaller artillery position known as the Rock Pile, ten miles west of Camp Carroll. Of course, they also maintained their presence at Khe Sanh and planned to expand that base.

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‍The enemy was in the area in strong force, and contacts began to increase early in 1967. Cpl. Michael John Scanlon of the 3rd Recon was the first Marine killed at Khe Sanh, January 18, 1967. Four Marine helicopters were lost during fighting on January 26-27.

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‍Recon patrols reported a significant NVA presence. USAF "Tigerhound" observation aircraft reported "an alarming buildup of fortifications and NVA activity on the hills overlooking the base." 

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‍The base commander was unconvinced. A Special Operations patrol went out and examined areas near Hills 881 and 861, reporting "numerous bunkers, lots of enemy." The base commander remained unconvinced. 

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‍The special ops team suggested firing a moving barrage of artillery up the hills while Marines follow behind to handle anything the artillery missed. The commander refused.

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‍He did, however, send two infantry platoons—the first and third platoons of Bravo Company, over to Hill 861 about a week later, on April 24, 1967, to "clean up" whatever enemy forces were there. By the time their fight was over, the Marines had lost 14 KIA, 18 WIA, and two were missing, with an estimated 100 enemy killed. The survivors and supporting helicopter pilots referred to enemy groups as companies. Not everyone was able to escape, so they stayed overnight.

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‍The Khe Sanh base commander still refused to believe there was a significant enemy force in the hills. A NVA soldier surrendered on April 25 and told the Marines he was from the 4th Battalion, 32nd Regiment. If valid, this indicated a substantial force in the area. Remember, the Marines at Khe Sanh only had two infantry battalions.

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‍RT Hawk, or Hawk Patrol, Alpha Co., 3rd Marine Recon, led by Cpl. Robin Walker, with one other corporal, three lance corporals, and three privates first class as team members, was inserted by H-46 helicopter into an area about five miles north of the three hills described above, on a ridge leading to Hill 665, on April 18, 1967. The team found so much evidence of NVA presence that they decided to move to higher ground to observe as much as they could. Hawk Patrol remained in its covert location for five days, reporting little enemy movement during the day but extensive activity at night.

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‍On the morning of April 25, a small group of enemy soldiers inadvertently walked into Hawk Patrol's kill zone and was engaged. Close combat broke out, and quickly the team was reduced to four effective fighters. Cpl. Rudolph, the assistant team leader, took command because Walker had been hit. Rudolph instructed Walker to take LCpl Baker and locate a landing zone (LZ) for helicopter extraction. They did so. 

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‍The first H-46 and its accompanying gunships were rattled by heavy enemy fire, preventing the rescue helicopter from landing. It turned out he had to abort because both door gunners' weapons jammed. The second H-46, commanded by Capt. House with co-pilot 1st Lt Dalton, approached while hiding below heavy gunship fire, landed, and evacuated all of Hawk Patrol. House and Dalton skillfully piloted their heavily damaged H-46 back to Khe Sanh and only made it by the grace of God.

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‍RT Hawk Patrol suffered six severely wounded or unconscious, two still able to operate. Their extraction was extremely difficult, taking heavy fire from automatic weapons and hand grenades as the crew attempted to carry the wounded to the helicopter. The helicopter was leaking transmission fluid. The initial head count of recovered team members was only five, and a crew member had to return to assist a Hawk Team member in retrieving two more wounded. They succeeded, and the entire Hawk Patrol was medevac’d to Danang and survived.

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‍This type of fighting continued into early May, again known as the Hill Battles of 1967. Both sides fought hard to control the high ground around Khe Sanh. The fighting was fierce and brutal.

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‍So, what is it Mr. Commander that you do not understand about significant NVA force buildup outside Khe Sanh, up in the hills?

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‍That’s a brief recap of the history leading up to RT Breaker Patrol, which involved six Marines and one Navy corpsman flown by helicopter to their target during the late afternoon of May 9, 1967. 

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‍As I mentioned earlier, they faced a tough battle on Hill 665. Four died, while three badly wounded were heroically rescued and survived. This occurred a year before the more well-known 1968 Siege of Khe Sanh. 

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‍Sgt. James Neil Tycz's letter to "Mom and Pop" was an exceedingly noble one. Once again, he said: 

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‍"None of us want to go, but that’s our job and I pray I will never fail to do it. Your Marine Son, Neil.” 

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‍Breaker Patrol KIA return home